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HOSPITAL MERGERS VERSUS CONSUMERS: AN ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS
1.

INTRODUCTION

The hospital industry has recently experienced an unprecedented
wave of mergers, acquisitions, and other forms of consolidation. In
1996, 235 transactions involving 768 hospitals took place.! From 1994
through 1996, nearly 40% of the nation's 5,200 non-federal hospitals
were involved in some type of merger or acquisition activity. 2 Although the numbers for 1997 dropped, they were still significant: 217
transactions involving 627 hospitals. 3 In addition, the size of mergers
and the number of hospitals controlled by one system are rising.4
The merger wave includes for-profit hospitals, non-profit hospitals,
and religiously affiliated hospitals. 5 Catholics for a Free Choice
("CFFC") identified fifty-seven mergers and affiliations between Catholic and non-Catholic providers between 1990 and 1995. 6 In a 1998
study update, CFFC identified an additional thirty-eight completed
consolidations between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals, with
twenty more pending. 7 This trend subsided in 1999, as the total number of mergers and acquisitions declined 28% from the previous year,

1. Bruce Japsen, Another Record Year for Dealmaking: Activity Among Medium-Size
Companies Fuels Continued Drive Toward Consolidation, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
Dec. 23, 1996, at 37.
2. Id. Merger or acquisition activity includes full-asset mergers, acquisitions,

3.
4.

5.
6.

lease agreements, joint ventures, and partnerships in which control or a
significant equity stake in a hospital changes hands. See Bruce Japsen, An
Off Year for Consolidation: '97 Tally Shows Sharp Cutback in Big Corporate Deals,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 12, 1998, at 40.
See Jaspen, An Off Year for Consolidation, supra note 2, at 40.
See Japsen, Another Record Year, supra note 1, at 37.
Japsen, An Off Year for Consolidation, supra note 2, at 40.
JUDITH C. APPELBAUM, NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAw CENTER, HOSPITAL MERGERS
AND THE THREAT TO WOMEN'S REPRODUCTrvE HEALTH SERVICES: USING ANTITRUST LAws TO FIGHT BACK 7 (1998).

7. Id.
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to 142.8 In addition, the number of hospitals involved dropped 23%
to 530. 9
Despite the decrease in the number of transactions in 1999, ten very
large transactions were completed, several of which involved secular
and non-secular hospitals. Of the ten corporate health care mergers,
the largest was the merger of Daughters of Charity National Health
System and Sisters of St. Joseph Health System. lO The merger of these
two Roman Catholic organizations created Ascension Health, which is
now comprised of seventy-three hospitals, with more than six billion
dollars in revenue. II
Hospital mergers are complicated because such mergers inevitably
affect a patient's choices and preferences. Patient choice of hospitals
is determined by many different variables, including: (1) patients who
want only a particular doctor to perform the necessary services or procedures;12 (2) others who choose a hospital based on their perception
of quality;13 and (3) other patients who wish to remain near their
home and choose a hospital within close proximity.14 Further, the
patient's managed care organization (MCO), commonly known as the
insurance company or third-party payor, is an increasingly important
variable in a patient'S choice of hospital.I 5 MCOs can influence, or
even change, a patient's behavior. 16
8. Deanna Bellandi, Spinoffs, Big Deals Dominate in '99: Despite Some High-Volume
Mergers, Total Hospital Transactions Dipped 28% Compared With the Previous
Year, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 10, 2000, at 36. The tally includes "mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, long-term leases and other partnerships in
which control changed significantly or an equity stake transferred ownership." Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Sharla Lichtman, Ontario Doctors Talk Back, FINANCIAL POST, Feb. 21,
2000, at C07; see also United States v. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp.
968,973 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (indicating that patients consider many factors
when deciding where to receive inpatient care).
13. See Medical Centers oj Excellence: An Idea Ripe Jor Implementation in Today's
Health Care Industry, HEALTH CARE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT,Jan. 1,2000, at
24. See also Mercy, 902 F. Supp. at 973.
14. See Medical Centers oj Excellence, supra note 13, at 24. See also United States v.
Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990);Jonathan B.
Baker, The Antitrust Analysis oj Hospital Mergers and the Transformation oj the
Hospital Industry, 51 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 142-143 (1988).
15. See Mercy, 902 F. Supp. at 973-974 (indicating that managed care has forced
individuals to consider the amount of their out-of-pocket expenses).
16. See id.
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When two or more hospitals merge, many concerns arise: what happens to the patient's choice? What does the patient do in an emergency when the doctor of choice no longer has privileges at the
merged hospital, but does have privileges at a hospital forty miles
away? What does a patient do when certain services are eliminated as
a result of the merger or when the patient wishes to remain in a hospital close to home, but the insurance company steers the patient to a
hospital thirty miles away because services are less expensive? Furthermore, what happens when there is a merger between the only two
hospitals in a rural area or when a Catholic and non-Catholic hospital
merge?
In a hospital merger case, a governmental agency, either the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of Justice (DOJ)
(collectively referred to as "the Agencies"), must assess any anti-competitive effects of the merger. I7 In addition, the relevant market, the
merged parties' relevant share in that market, the market concentration, and, if applicable, any efficiency rebuttals must be examined. IS
The issue of patient choice, i.e. consumer choice, can generally be
addressed in any part of this analysis, however, it is typically overlooked when hospitals merge.
Although limited consumer choice may prove to be a fatal factor in
some merger cases,I9 hospital merger cases have been evaluated differently. In a hospital merger case, the consumer choice issue appears to be overlooked when defining the geographic market, and
also when the parties prove that substantial efficiencies20 will result
from the merger. 21

17. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 1992 HORI.
ZONTAL MERCER GUIDELINES, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, 41554 (1992).
18. See id.
19. E.g., National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978) (stating that agreements limiting consumer choice impede the
workings of the marketplace); Full Draw Productions v. Easton Sports, Inc.,
182 F.3d 745, 755 (lOth Cir. 1999) (citing limited consumer choice as a
factor in finding that the defendant's behavior was anticompetitive). But see
F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 248 (1972) (stating that
while limiting consumer choice is a factor to be considered, it alone would
not support a finding of unfair trade practice).
20. See infra Part V.B.2.
21. See Richard D. Raskin & Bruce M. Zessar, Telling the Efficiencies Stary: Practical
Lessons from the Hospital Merger Field, 13 ANTITRUST 21, 23 (1999) (stating
that the FTC has indicated that the ~hospital industry is an area in which
efficiencies can be of particular significance" as ~[c]ertain characteristics of
hospitals lend themselves to effective efficiencies cases").

78

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 30

Due to the uniqueness of the hospital market,22 the Agencies often
misconstrue the geographic market in which hospitals and consumers
are located. 23 This misconstruction, combined with various ways to
include consumers in the market, draws attention away from consumer choice. Instead of arguing the nuances of the geographic market, the Agencies should set a standard definition that focuses on
maintaining consumer choice.
Furthermore, the two issues, limited consumer choice and efficiencies, can often contradict each other. For example, in order for the
newly-merged hospital to be more efficient, it may curb or cut some
services previously available at either one, or both, of the hospitals. 24
Although curbing a service may lead to cost savings, some consumers
will be unable to obtain a necessary service, or unable to visit the most
convenient location.
Consumer choice is especially relevant in mergers involving a Catholic and non-Catholic hospital where reproductive services may be
curbed or eliminated. 25 As hospitals find it increasingly necessary and
cost-efficient to consolidate,26 the issue of limited consumer choice
should be placed at the forefront of any agency's analysis.
Analyses of hospital merger cases tend to focus on the efficiencies
defense raised by the defendants. 27 In other merger cases, this defense is usually unacceptable because efficiencies are difficult to measure and are even more difficult to prove. 28 Surprisingly, in hospital
merger cases, the courts are often inclined to accept an efficiencies
defense as an absolute defense, thereby precluding any scrutiny by
either of the Agencies. 29
22. See William G. Kopit & Tanya B. Vanderbilt, Unique Issues in the Analysis of
Non-Profit Hospital Mergers, 35 WASHBURN LJ. 254, 254-59 (1996).
23. See infra Part V.C.l.b.
24. See Raskin & Zessar, supra note 21, at 23; see also Jonathan Choslovsky,
Agency Review of Health Care Industry Mergers: Proper Procedure or Unnecessary
Burden?, 10 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 291, 294-295 (Spring 1996); Baker, supra
note 14, at 99-100.
25. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, When a Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER L. REv.
1087, 1088 (1996); see also APPLEBAUM, supra note 6, at 9.
26. See Raskin & Zessar, supra note 21, at 21; see also Choslovsky, supra note 24,
at 293-94.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 983 F. Supp.
121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285
(W.D. Mich. 1996), afJ'd in unpublished opinion, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997)
(table).
28. See FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1089 (D.D.C. 1997).
29. See Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 983 F. Supp. at 137; Butterworth Health
Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1300; see also HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41562.
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In addition, the Agencies, through their guidelines, and the courts,
through case law, have severely impaired a party's ability to challenge
a rural hospital merger. The rural exception,30 in large part, is a spinoff of the efficiencies defense. Currently, this exception, in effect, encourages health care monopolies in rural areas. Thus, because monopolies completely eliminate choice, consumers in rural areas are
left with no options when hospitals merge.
As a result of these factors, when the Agencies challenge a merger,
consumers get lost amid a mass of definitions and speculations. For
example, consumers are repeatedly lost in battles over what constitutes a geographic market and in the guesses that comprise the efficiencies defense. Though patients are the group most affected by a
merger, patients are a secondary consideration for decision-makers
who evaluate the effects of the merger. Consumers and their choice,
however, should be at the forefront of all merger analyses. Through a
careful look at case history, the governmental agencies challenging
mergers should be able to create a case that focuses on, and ultimately
protects, consumers.
Section II of this Comment provides a general discussion and background of the health care industry and gives a brief overview of hospital mergers. 31 Section III discusses the antitrust environment as it
relates to the health care industry.32 In Section IV, this Comment discusses horizontal merger regulations as promulgated by the Agencies. 33 Section V examines merger analysis under the Clayton Act. 34
Section VI explains the exception allowing rural hospitals to merge,
despite the consumer choice consequences, without scrutiny by either
of the Agencies. 35 In Section VII, this Comment briefly describes the
convergence of the Clayton and Sherman Acts, and provides an analysis of merger cases under the Sherman Act. 36 Finally, the conclusion
in Section VIII discusses how the Agencies can and should advocate
consumer choice. 37

30.
3l.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See infra Part VI.
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part VI.
See discussion infra Part VII.
See discussion infra Part VIII.
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II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Evolution of the Health Care Industry Encouraged Mergers, Eviscerating Patient Choice

Since the 1980s, the health care industry experienced dramatic
changes. Most notably, changes occurred in the regulatory environment, which affected hospital merger analysis. 38 Regulatory changes
were a result of cost escalation, changes in insurance, changes in hospital reimbursement and patient lack of information. 39 These regulatory changes resulted in increased hospital merger and acquisition
activity during the early 1980s. 40
The changes in the health care field began with insurance and hospital reimbursement under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
During the 1960s and 1970s, hospitals had very little incentive to minimize costs or compete on cost-basis because health care insurance incorporated retrospective cost-based or charge-based reimbursementY
This prepaid health insurance led to both an over-utilization of health
care services provided by hospitals and physicians and to increased
health care prices. 42
The patients' lack of information exacerbated the inefficient high
costs and over-utilization associated with the provision of health care
services. 43 Doctors decided the amount of care needed, where that
care would be administered, and then administered the necessary
care. 44 Given that physician compensation was related to the level
and amount of care selected for a patient, the cost-based reimbursement system encouraged overuse of services and extended lengths of
stays. Thus, the cost of health care rose to inefficient levels. 45
Health care cost escalation was also a result of the regulatory
scheme established in the 1960s. 46 Continued increases in cost, in
38. Baker, supra note 14, at 94. The "regulatory environment" in the health
care industry takes into consideration patients, hospitals, doctors, and insurance companies.
39. See infra notes 41-63 and accompanying text.
40. Baker, supra note 14, at 94.
41. [d. at 95. Cost-based reimbursement was a fee-for-seIVice concept, whereby
Medicare or Medicaid reimbursed hospitals based on the institution's
charges for all services rendered. SeeJosEPH SNOE, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY SYSTEMS 620 (West Group 1998).
42. Baker, supra note 14, at 95.
43. See id.
44. [d.
45. See id.
46. [d. at 96. Under cost-based reimbursement, patients were entitled to full
reimbursement for medical care with the exception of opportunity costs,
which included travel and time away from work or leisure. [d.
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part due to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, prompted Congress to address the issue. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress
enacted the main elements of the health care regulatory scheme. 47
Congress limited the quantity of heath care provided to consumers
in order to control increasing costs. 48 State regulatory boards were
created to supervise large hospital capital expenditures through the
use of Certificate of Need ("CON") applications. 49 Congress also created peer review programs to monitor and limit physician choice of
care to further decrease costs. 50 These changes were cumbersome to
most states, and did not effectively control spiraling health care costs.
The Prospective Payment System ("PPS"), introduced in 1983 and
in effect today, replaced the 1970s monitoring system. Under the
PPS, Medicare and Medicaid provide a standardized payment, based
on a predetermined formula, to every hospital for each patient with a
given diagnosis. 51 This cap, or standardized payment, guarantees that
every hospital will recover the average cost of treating each patient. 52
Since a hospital will only receive a fixed cost, a longer length of stay
causes a hospital to lose money. Conversely, providing minimal services to a patient in a shorter time frame (known as under-utilization)
allows the hospital to profit from the fixed payment. 53 As a result,
hospitals must lower treatment costs or shorten lengths of stay in order to increase profits. 54 Thus, the current payment system encourages hospitals to contain costs.
47. Id; see also National Health Planning and Development Act, Pub. L. No. 93641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300k (repealed 1986». This Act, inter alia,
subjected large hospital expenditures to the supervision of regulatory
boards through the requirement of a Certificate of Need in order to add
services, facilities, or beds. See infra note 49 for a brief discussion of Certificate of Need.
48. Baker, supra note 14, at 96.
49. Id. Essentially, CONs are entry barriers. See FTC v. University Health, Inc.,
938 F.2d 1206, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991). In order to build a new facility, add a
service, add beds, or open a new hospital, the state must approve the addition or change through the CON process. CON attempts to coordinate the
development of new health care facilities by preventing unnecessary health
care costs. Id. CON laws regulate the supply of equipment and facilities
because normal market forces of supply and demand are thought not to
work in the health care market. See SNOE, supra note 41, at 308.
50. Baker, supra note 14, at 97.
51. Id. The standardized payment is based on the average costs associated with
the treatment of the patient's diagnostic related group (DRG). Id.
52. Id.
53. See SNOE, supra note 41, at 621.
54. See Baker, supra note 14, at 98.
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The overall result of these changes to the regulatory environment
increased competition among hospitals. 55 This increased competition
led to a variety of alternatives within the structure of the health care
industry. 56 For example, the rapid growth of multi-hospital systems
may be a direct result of the cost-cutting pressures created by the
evolving regulatory environment. 57 In addition, peripheral centers
have entered the market as competition for hospitals. 58 Due to technology advancements, alternative providers, such as outpatient treatment centers, now provide some treatment that was previously only
available on an inpatient basis. 59 As a result, the demand for inpatient
treatment has declined and hospitals are left to administer, strictly on
an inpatient basis, the most expensive, technologically dependent,
and complex forms of services. 60
Given the current reimbursement system, PPS, hospitals continue
to lose profits. Many hospitals now find a merger the most attractive
alternative in order to curb costs and profit losses. 61 Ultimately, this
changing environment may have induced the wave of hospital mergers and acquisitions that require antitrust analysis. 62 These changes
have set the stage for an increasing number of acquisitions and mergers in a struggle to survive the financial constraints of the current
health care system. 63

B.

What Happens When Hospitals Merge?

l.

The Negative Effect on Consumers

When hospitals merge, a major consolidation of facilities and services usually takes place. 64 For example, if both hospitals have excess
55. See id.
56. See id. at 99.
57. [d. at 99-100. Hospitals often form large systems to adjust to managed care
costs, enhance purchasing power, and acquire capital for increased borrowing power. See SNOE, supra note 41, at 818; see also Choslovsky, supra note
24, at 292.
58. Choslovsky, supra note 24, at 293-94. Peripheral centers include outpatient
treatment centers owned by managed care organizations or physician
groups. [d.
59. [d. at 293. For example, many surgeries such as orthoscopic knee operations, typically an inpatient procedure, are now performed in an outpatient
treatment facility.
60. [d. at 294.
61. See SNOE, supra note 41, at 813.
62. See Baker, supra note 14, at 100.
63. See Choslovsky, supra note 24, at 298.
64. Consolidation of services and facilities can include the following: laboratory
services can be combined at one facility in order to eliminate duplicative
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bed capacity, all general acute-care services may be moved to one facility, using the other facility for different services, or closing it altogether. If state and CON 65 laws permit, the second facility may
become a different health care institution, such as a skilled nursing
facility. The most common result is that one hospital is closed and all
services are consolidated into the remaining hospital.
The ultimate result of consolidation is that patients lose their ability
to choose a hospital or doctor. For example, the hospital nearest to a
patient's home may have closed, while the newly-merged facility is located thirty miles away. The patient's doctor may not have been
granted privileges at the merged hospital, thereby forcing the patient
to find a new doctor or to travel to the hospital where the doctor has
privileges.
2.

Catholic and Non-Catholic Hospital Mergers-the Detrimental
Impact on Consumers

Although the merger of a Catholic and non-Catholic hospital will
have the same results as described above, these mergers have the additional burden of creating compromises on the issue of reproductive
services. Most Catholic hospitals follow the "Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services" ("Directives"). 66 These Directives require Catholic facilities, and professionals practicing in
those facilities, to adopt and adhere to them as a condition of medical
privilege and employment. 67 The practical effect of the Directives is
limiting services in accordance with the beliefs of the Catholic faith.
testing facilities; various medical units can be consolidated, which results in
a significant reduction in staff members; the dietary department of both
hospitals can be consolidated using one central food production facility;
purchasing and management can be consolidated and achieve a reduction
in personnel through negotiating volume discounts with vendors that the
hospitals could not obtain separately; laundry services can be consolidated
so that one hospital can process both hospitals' linens; management information services personnel can be reduced; computer services can be consolidated to one operating system; administration can be consolidated to
one umbrella for both hospitals or the one remaining hospital, depending
on the circumstances of the merger; and technical services, such as obstetrics or cardiology, may be consolidated at the most advanced facility, or the
facility where the service is currently in place. See Raskin & Zessar, supra
note 21, at 22.
65. See supra note 49 and infra notes 258-59 for a discussion of CON.
66. See APPELBAUM, supra note 6, at 7-8. The Directives "provide 'authoritative
guidance' to Catholic health care institutions and professionals on standards of behavior that flow from church doctrine." Id. at 7.
67. Id. at 7-8.
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For example, the Directives prohibit abortion, contraceptive services
or counseling, sterilization procedures, and infertility treatments. 68
Thus, if a Catholic hospital and non-Catholic hospital merge, the effect on services available can be even greater than that of a merger
between two secular hospitals.
In a merger involving a Catholic hospital and a non-Catholic hospital, the secular hospital may be required to abide by the Directives. 69
As a result, services such as abortion, surgical sterilization, tubal ligation, and distribution of the "morning-after" pill for rape victims may
be eliminated. 70 Consequently, patients seeking these services may be
unduly burdened with excess costs and travel time to facilities that will
provide the necessary service.
III.

THE ANTITRUST ENVIRONMENT SURROUNDING THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY

A.

Evolution ofAntitrust Regulation Envelops the Health Care Industry and
its Consumers

While the health care industry, particularly in the 1980s, experienced some dramatic changes, the legal environment also experienced some changes making antitrust principles more applicable to
the health care industry.71 First, the Supreme Court, in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar,72 held that antitrust principles embodied in the
Sherman Act apply to the activities of "learned professionals."73 Thus,
doctors, their practices, and the hospitals in which they worked, were
no longer exempt from antitrust law.
Second, in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital,74 the Supreme Court held that a restraint on competition, even in a local hospital market, can "substantially and adversely affect interstate
commerce."75 Therefore, hospitals were subject not only to the Com68. Id. at 8.
69. Id. at 7-8. This can often be the breaking point for a secular/non-secular
merger, where some merger negotiations have broken down over the Catholic hospital'S staunch stand on the Directives.
70. Id. at 8.
71. See Baker, supra note 14, at 106.
72. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
73. Id. at 787 (indicating that the nature of an occupation or profession does
not provide "sanctuary" from the antitrust laws).
74. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
75. Id. at 743 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195
(1974)). In this case, "the restraint allegedly affected the interstate flow of
a hospital'S medicine and supplies, third-party payment and management
fees .... " John J. Miles & Mary Susan Philp, Symposium: Current Developments
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merce Clause, but also to the government's jurisdiction under the antitrust laws.
Finally, in National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue
Cross of Kansas City,'6 the Supreme Court held that the National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act77 does not provide
blanket immunity to activities that arguably fall under the rubric of
health planning. 78 The repeal of the Act left states with the option to
regulate their respective health care industries. 79 A state's authority to
approve a CON for a hospital merger does not, however, immunize
the merger from judicial review under the applicable antitrust laws. 80
As a result of these decisions, the FTC and DO] became increasingly
interested in antitrust enforcement in the health care industry.81
B.

Congressional Action to Protect Consumers in this Merger Market

Congress sought a way to protect consumers and small businesses
from the anticompetitive effects of mergers. 82 In 1914, Congress
passed the Clayton Act83 to prevent economic concentration and to
protect interstate commerce. 84 This Act prohibited persons engaged
in, or affecting, interstate commerce from acquiring "stock or other
share capital" of another. 85
Under this Act, corporations were able to avoid scrutiny by acquiring non-stock assets. 86 This change reflected congressional concern
that the economy had become too concentrated in the hands of a few
large companies,87 and sought to limit increases in economic concen-

76.
77.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

in Health Law; Hospitals Caught in the Antitrust Net: An Overoiew, 24 DUQ. L.
REv. 489, 496 (1985).
452 U.S. 378 (1981).
Pub. L. No. 93-641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300k (repealed 1986». See
sUfrra note 47 and accompanying text for a brief description of this Act.
See National Gerimedical Hasp., 452 U.S. at 393 (indicating that the Act is not
so incompatible with antitrust laws so as to create a .. 'pervasive' repeal of
the antitrust laws as applied to every action taken in response to the healthcare planning process").
See Baker, sUfrra note 14, at 107.
See id.
See Miles & Philp, sUfrra note 75, at 496.
See S. Rep. No. 81-1775, at 2-3 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N., for a
discussion of the legislative history of the Sherman Act.
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-19, 21-27(West 1997).
See generally United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966);
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955).
15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 1997).
S. REp. No. 81-1775, at 2.
See id. at 3.
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tration that resulted from corporate mergers. 88 Congress later
amended the Clayton Act by passing the Celler-Kefauver Act,89 which
afforded further protection for consumers by eliminating a corporation's ability to acquire the assets of another corporation. 90 The Celler-Kefauver Act sought to prevent those acts, which would tend to
lessen competition at their incipiency.91
IV.

A.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ANTITRUST REGULATION
Horizontal Merger Guidelines

In 1992, the Agencies issued the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
("Guidelines").92 The Guidelines describe the Agencies' uniform enforcement policy concerning the Sherman Act,93 the Clayton Act,94
and the Federal Trade Commission Act,95 and outlines a five-step
methodology for analyzing mergers under the Clayton Act. 96
The first step in the analysis is to decide whether the firm exceeded
its lawfully permissible market power; the greater the market concentration, the greater market power a firm can exert. 97 To analyze this
relationship, the market power98 is defined first, then the market concentration is determined. Next, the Agencies must ascertain the product market, which is the market where: (1) the same products or
services are sold by competitive firms; (2) close substitutes exist; or
(3) other firms can produce or sell the same products or services with
little effort. 99
88. See id.
89. Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified in 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 18, 21 (West
1997)) .
90. See S. REP. No. 81-1775, at 2.
91. See id. at 4. See generally Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 206 F.2d 163, 166 (3rd Cir. 1953).
92. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552.
93. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (West 1997).
94. Id. §§ 12-19, 21-27 (as amended by Celler-Kefauver Act of Dec. 29, 1950, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 18,21 (West 1997)).
95. Id. §§ 41-77.
96. 57 Fed. Reg. at 41553 (1992).
97. Id. § 1.0.
98. Market power is defined as the ability of a seller to maintain prices above
the competitive level for a significant period of time, or to depress prices
below the competitive price level. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 17,57 Fed. Reg. at 41553. The result of exercise of market power is a
transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers. See id.
99. Id. § 1.11.
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The second step in the analysis is to examine the market shares
held by the participants, in the markets just defined,lOo according to
the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index ("HHI") .101 Both the post-merger
HHI and the HHI change from pre-merger to post-merger are
analyzed. 102
In the third step, ease of entry into the market is reviewed. 103 If
other firms can easily enter the market in a timely fashion and with
significant force, then they could deter the anticompetitive effects of
high market concentration and the increased market power of the
merging firms. 104
Step four affords the merging firms the opportunity to demonstrate
significant efficiencies as a result of the merger. If efficiencies could
be achieved by means other than a merger, the Agencies will reject
those efficiencies. 105 If not, then the Agencies will not challenge that
merger. 106
The final step in the analysis is for the Agencies to consider, first,
whether one of the merging firms will fail absent the merger, and
second, whether that firm's assets will exit the relevant market. 107 To
determine whether the firm will fail, the Agencies will closely assess
whether the "failing firm" has explored all possible alternatives to
merger or acquisition. 108 If the merger will not enhance the market
power of the merging firms, the Agencies will not challenge the
merger. 109

B.

Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care

In 1993, the Agencies issued the "Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care" ("Statements") .110 The Agencies subse100. Id.
101. Id. § 1.5. The Agencies generally characterize market concentration as unconcentrated (less than 1,000), moderately concentrated (between 1,000
and 1,800), and highly concentrated (greater than 1,800). Id.
102. Id. § 1.51. In a highly concentrated market (HHI greater than 1,800), an
increase of over fifty points will raise concern, and an increase over 100 will
create a presumption of market power. Id. § LSI (c).
103. Id. § 3.0.

104. Id.
105. Id. § 4.0 (1997).
106. Id.

107. Id. § 5.0.
108. Id. § 5.l.
109. Id. § 5.0.
110. DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMM1SSION, STATEMENTS OF

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTHCARE

(1993).
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quently revised the Statements in 1994 and 1996.11 1 The 1996
Statements reflect the goal of "ensur[ing] a competitive marketplace
in which consumers will have the benefit of high quality, cost-effective
health care and a wide range of choices .... "112
To effectuate this goal, Statement 1, entitled "Merger Among Hospitals," creates an antitrust safety zone and describes the analysis of
mergers among hospitals that fall outside of this zone. 113 A merger
falling within the antitrust safety zone will not be challenged. For example, if two general acute-care hospitals merge where one hospital
has: (1) an average of fewer than 100 licensed beds over the three
most recent years; and (2) an average daily inpatient census of fewer
than forty patients over the three most recent years,114 then the Agencies will not challenge the hospital merger.
The Agencies follow the procedures set forth in the Guidelines to
analyze mergers that fall outside of the antitrust safety zone. If the
analysis reveals that the merger will not result in a substantial lessening of competition, the Agencies will not challenge the merger. 115 Situations precluding a challenge include transactions where: (1) the
merger will not increase market power because of the post-merger
presence of strong competitors or because the merging hospitals are
sufficiently differentiated; (2) the merged hospitals could achieve savings not otherwise possible; or (3) the merger will eliminate a hospital
that is likely to fail. 116
Ill. Id. at 2.
112. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Introduction to
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Healthcare (1996) (hereinafter "1996 STATEMENTS"); see also Richard C. Wade, Hospital Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust, 1997 DET. C.L. REv. 1281, 1291 (1997). The 1996
Statements contain the following enforcement policies: (1) mergers among
hospitals; (2) hospital joint ventures involving high technology or other expensive health care equipment; (3) hospital joint ventures involving specialized clinical or other expensive health care services; (4) providers'
collective provision of non-fee-related information to purchasers of health
care services; (5) providers' collective provision of fee-related information
to purchasers of health care services; (6) provider participation in exchanges of price and cost information; (7) joint purchasing arrangements
among health care providers; (8) physician network joint ventures; and (9)
multiprovider networks. See 1996 STATEMENTS. This comment will only focus on Statement 1: Mergers Among Hospitals.
113. 1996 STATEMENTS, supra note 112, at Statement 1, Introduction.
114. Id. at Statement 1, § A.
115. Id. at Statement 1, § B. See also supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text
for a description of the five-step methodology used to analyze mergers.
116. See 1996 STATEMENTS, supra note 112, at Statement 1, § B.
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Hospitals that are considering mergers can seek preliminary review
under the DOl's business review procedure 117 or the FTC's advisory
opinion procedure 118 for a determination of the Agencies' probability
of challenging the merger. 119
V.

THE CLAYTON ACT ENSURES CONSUMER CHOICE WHEN
HOSPITALS MERGE
If a hospital merger is questioned as a result of limiting consumer

choice, the Agencies have several cases for guidance. 12o These cases
strongly support an argument to block a hospital merger that would
limit consumer choice and, in effect, undermine the Agencies' goal of
"ensur[ing] a wide range of choices."121
A.

Maximization of Consumer Choice and the Clayton Act

The Clayton Act,122 enacted in 1914,123 and amended by the CellerKefauver Act124 in 1950,125 prohibits one company from acquiring
part or all of the assets, stock, or other capital of a competitor where
the effect of such action may substantially lessen competition or create
a monopoly.126 Hospital mergers, involving the acquisition of one
company's assets by another, are generally analyzed under this act. 127
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1999).
See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4 (2000).
See 1996 STATEMENTS, supra note 112, at Statement 1, § B.
See infra Part V.A.
1996 STATEMENTS, supra note 114, at Introduction.
15 U.S.CA §§ 12, 13, 14-19,21,22-27 (West 1997).
15 U.S.CA § 12 (West 1997).
Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as 15 U.S.CA §§ 18, 21 (West
1997) ).
125. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the CellerKefauver Act.
126. 15 U.S.CA § 18 (West 1997). The Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of
the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Id.
127. See generally United States v. Long IslandJewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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When assessing a merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act, the
test of a competitive market is "not only whether small companies
flourish but also whether consumers are well served."128 This test was
articulated and subsequently applied in United States v. Tidewater
Marine Service, Inc. 129
Tidewater Marine is important because it recognizes the impact on
customers in issues surrounding mergers. 130 While the focus of hospital mergers may also be the customer, those customers are distinguishable from the consumers in Tidewater Marine. Consumers in hospital
merger cases are patients who are not able to simply switch services or
perform the services on their own, given the specialized services they
seek. In a hospital merger case, the uniqueness of consumers and
their lack of bargaining power pose a significant threat to the patient's
ability to choose. Thus, the Agencies should challenge hospital mergers that limit, or have the potential to limit, consumer choice.
In order to challenge such a merger, the FfC must first establish
that it has jurisdiction over the merger and the parties. 131 Once the
jurisdictional requirement is satisfied, the FfC analyzes the merger
for anticompetitive effects, the relevant market, market concentration, ease of entry, and potential defenses such as efficiencies or failing company.132

128. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 n.43 (1963).
Section 7's fundamental purpose is to "arrest the trend toward concentration ... before the consumer's alternatives disappeared through merger."
[d. at 367; see also United States v. Tidewater Marine Serv., Inc., 284 F. Supp.
324, 338 (E.D. La. 1968) (citing United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
168 F. Supp. 576, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (stating that when measuring the
anticompetitive effect of a merger, "we must examine its effect on the competitors as well as the customers of the merged companies")).
129. 284 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. La. 1968). There, the court determined that the
customers were not harmed by the merger of companies that supplied
boats for transporting supplies and equipment to offshore drilling sites. [d.
at 340. The companies that supplied the boats were much smaller than the
oil companies that required the boats. [d. Therefore, the boat suppliers
had to remain subservient to the needs of their customers. [d. The large
oil companies could, if necessary, own and operate their own supply boats if
they became dissatisfied with the price or service of the charter boats. [d.
130. See id. at 338-340.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.
1990).
132. 57 Fed. Reg. 41553, 41554 (1992).
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FTC Jurisdiction

The Clayton Act authorizes FTC jurisdiction over corporate acquisitions where the parties are engaged in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce. 133 Hospitals engage in, or affect, interstate commerce by contracting with MCOs, treating patients who live in other
states, contracting with pharmaceutical companies to buy drugs, or
paying management fees. 134 Hospitals involved in mergers thus fall
under the FTC's jurisdiction. 135
Jurisdiction over for-profit hospitals has not been an issue because
they have assets. However, a question eventually arose about the jurisdictional status of non-profit hospitals. Non-profit organizations do
not have stock or assets. The Clayton Act, as amended by the CellerKefauver Act, prohibits the acquisition of stock or other assets in a
merger that would limit competition. 136 Thus, the FTC's jurisdiction
over non-profit organizations was questioned.
In dicta, the court in United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.137 stated
that the FTC had jurisdiction over non-profit hospitals. 13s In that
case, the DOJ brought suit under section 7 of the Clayton Act139 and
section 1 of the Sherman Act 140 to e~oin the merger of the two largest non-profit hospitals in Rockford, Illinois. 141 The lower court held
that the merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, but did not address the Sherman Act charge. 142 The hospitals appealed, arguing
that the Clayton Act did not apply to a merger between non-profit
entities. 143

133. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 c.
134. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
135. See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 266 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing FTC v.
University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (lIth Cir. 1991»; United States v.
Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990».
136. 15 U.S.CA § 18 (West 1997).
137. 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
138. [d. at 1281.
139. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits asset-acquisition mergers that lessen
competition. 15 U.S.CA § 18 (West 1997).
140. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits mergers if they restrain trade. 15
U.S.CA § 1 (West 1997).
141. Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1281.
142. [d. at 1280.
143. [d. As noted above, the Clayton Act prohibits asset-acquisition mergers. See
supra note 139. The hospitals, as non-profit entities, argued that, by definition, they did not have "assets." Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1280.
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Section 11 of the Clayton Ace 44 gives authority to five agencies to
enforce the Clayton Act; one of these agencies being the FfC. 145 As
such, the court determined that the asset-acquisition provision of section 7 of the Clayton Act exempted only those mergers in regulated
industries enumerated in section 11,146 of which the hospital industry
was not included. 147 Ultimately, the court held that the merger was
not subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act because the non-profit hospitals did not have assets in the form of stock or share capital. 148
Nonetheless, the court held that the merger was a violation of the
Sherman Act. 149
Although not raised by the DOl, the court determined, in dicta,
that the merger was subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act. 150 The
144. 15 U.S.C.A. § 21 (West 1997).
145. lWckford, 898 F.2d at 1280. At the time ofthis case, 15 U.S.C.A. § 21 stated,
in relevant part: "'Authority to enforce compliance with sections 2, 3, 7,
and 8 of this Act by the persons respectively subject thereto is hereby vested
in ... the Federal Trade Commission where applicable to all other character of commerce.'" [d. (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 21). However, the substance
remains the same: "Authority to enforce compliance with sections 13, 14,
18, and 19 of this title by the persons respectively subject thereto is vested
in ... the Federal Trade Commission where applicable to all other character of commerce." [d. See also 15 U.S.C.A. § 21 (a) (West 1997).
146. lWckford, 898 F.2d at 1280. The regulated industries not subject to FTC
jurisdiction include: common carriers (as regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission and the
Civil Aeronautics Board), and banks (as regulated by the Federal Reserve
Board) . See id.
147. lWckford, 898 F.2d at 1280.
148. [d. at 1281 (concluding that "as the parties have framed the issues the merger is
not subject to section 7"). The court, although believing the merger was
subject to the Clayton Act, declined to extend its interpretative powers. [d.
149. [d. at 1281 (affirming on alternative grounds and determining that although the district court judge did not reach a conclusion on the Sherman
Act, it could do so since the findings demonstrate a violation of section 1).
The court doubted whether there was a substantive difference between the
standard for judging a merger under section 1 of the Sherman Act and the
standard for judging the same merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act.
See id. at 1282. If a transaction restrains trade, it violates section 1. [d. If the
effect of the transaction substantially lessens competition, it violates section
7. [d. The court went on further to say that the judicial interpretations of
the two acts have converged. [d. (citing 2 Areeda & Turner, Antitrust Law,
11 304 (1978); 4 Areeda & Turner, Antitrust Law, 11 906); see also Miles &
Philp, supra note 75, at 665 (noting that leading commentators suggest
there is little difference between section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 7
of the Clayton Act); see infra notes 375-81 and accompanying text.
150. lWckford, 898 F.2d at 1281.
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court said that the reference in the Clayton Act to the jurisdiction of
the FTC should refer to section 11 of that Act, and not section 4 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (the "FTC Act"}.151
Later, the court in FTC v. University Health, Inc.,152 conclusively determined that non-profit hospitals are subject to the FTC's jurisdiction. 153 The court determined that the Clayton Act's reference in
section 7 to the '~urisdiction of the [FTC]" referred to the limitation
set forth in that same act, not to the FTC Act. 154
The University Health court also looked at Congress' intent when creating the Clayton Act. First, Congress did not provide an explicit exemption to non-profit hospitals for asset acquisitions in section 7. 155
Second, the court concluded that section 11 is evidence of Congress'
intent to exempt only certain entities regulated by other governmental agencies from the FTC's enforcement of section 7. 156 Congress
specifically exempted certain transactions governed by other federal
agencies, but it declined to limit the FTC's jurisdiction in enforcing
the Clayton Act to the jurisdiction set forth in the FTC Act. 157 Therefore, all other entities, including non-profits, are subject to FTC
jurisdiction. 158
As a result of this case, although many hospitals and other entities
are non-profit, the FTC can exercise jurisdiction over them in accordance with the asset-acquisition provision contained in section 7 of
the Clayton Act. 159 The FTC cannot, however, challenge a merger
under the FTC Act where one party is non-profit because the FTC Act
only applies to for-profit businesses. 16o Despite the fact that the FTC
Act is the fundamental charter for the FTC,161 the Clayton Act pro151. Id. Section 4 of the FTC Act declares that unfair methods of competition
are illegal. 15 V.S.CA § 45(a)(l) (West 1997). It empowers and directs
the FTC to "prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations ... from using
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 V.S.C.A. § 45(a)(2).
152. 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
153. Id. at 1215.
154. Id. The FTC Act gives the FTC jurisdiction over corporations, defined as
any entity designed to carry on business "for its own profit or that of its
members." Id. at 1214.
155. Id. at 1214-15.
156. Id. at 1215. See also supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text for further
discussion of section 11.
157. University Heath, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1216-17.
158. Id. at 1215.
159. See Baker, supra note 14, at 112.
160. See id.
161. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1214.
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vides an additional independent basis for FTC challenges. 162 Therefore, non-profit hospitals are subject to FTC jurisdiction under section
7 of the Clayton Act.

C.

Adverse Competitive Effects

"The underlying theme of the Guidelines is that mergers should not
be permitted to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its
exercise."163 A merger can diminish competition in one of two ways.
The first is when the merger reduces the total number of firms in a
market so that the remaining firms are able to collectively exercise
market power, such as collusion to raise prices. 164 The second is
through unilateral action that prevents consumers from finding substitutes. 165 In order to establish a prima facie case of an antitrust violation, the Agencies must determine that the merger will have
anticompetitive effects, such as, limitation of choice, on consumers.166

1.

Relevant Market

Determining the relevant market is a necessary predicate to finding
an antitrust violation,167 because a merger's effect on competition
cannot be evaluated without a well-defined market. 168 The relevant
market consists of two elements: the product market and the geographic market. 169

a.

Product Market

"General acute care inpatient hospital services is a product market
that has been commonly used to evaluate the competitive effects of
hospital mergers."170 The FTC characterizes these services as a "com162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See Baker, supra note 14, at 112.
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41553.
See id. at 41558.
See id. at 41560.
See id. at 41553.
See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 268 (8th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 268 n.12.
See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41553
(defining the relevant market as a "group of products and a geographic
area that is no bigger than necessary to satisfy" the "small but significant
and non-transitory" increase in price test); see e.g., FTC v. University Health,
Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 1991); FTC v. Butterworth Health
Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd in unpublished opinion, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (table); United States v. Mercy Health
Services, 902 F. Supp. 968, 976 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated 107 F.3d 632 (8th
Cir. 1997); see also Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268.
170. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268.
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mon host of distinct seIVices and capabilities that are necessary to
meet the medical, surgical, and other needs of patients, e.g., operating rooms, anesthesia, intensive care capabilities, 24-hour nursing
care, lodging, and pharmaceuticals."171
There are several different levels of care that can also comprise the
relevant product market, such as primary, secondary, or tertiary care
seIVices. Primary care seIVices include basic or routine inpatient hospital seIVices available at most general acute-care hospitals, such as
normal childbirth, general medicine, and general surgeryp2 Secondary care seIVices include certain specialties and more difficult procedures, such as orthopedics, ophthalmology, and cardiac
catheterization. 173 Tertiary care seIVices include the most specialized,
complex and expensive procedures, such as high-risk obstetric services, neonatal care, neurosurgery, heart or orthopedic surgery, advanced cancer treatment, and burn care. 174
In general, demand substitutability for health care seIVices is very
limited. 175 Patients who need a particular procedure are not able to
substitute another procedure to cure their problem. 176 For example,
a patient requiring coronary bypass surgery cannot elect a hip replacement to fIx the patient's heart simply because it is less expensive. 177
Hence, defIning the relevant product market is crucial not only to an
antitrust analysis, but also to ensuring that consumers have choices
among health care providers.

b.
(1)

Geographic Market
DefInition

In accordance with the Guidelines, the Agencies will determine the
geographic market to be the smallest region in which the monopoly
would fInd it profItable to impose a "small but signifIcant and nontransitory increase in price" ("SSNIP") .1'8 The extent to which consumers respond to the SSNIP must be evaluated within the context of
the geographic market. 179 If a fIrm outside the region could prevent
that price increase, through the exercise of competitive restraint, then
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Butterwarth, 938 F.2d at 1288 n.2.
[d.
[d.
[d.
See Baker, supra note 14, at 123.
See id.
See Rnckford, 898 F.2d at 1284.
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES,

[d. at 41554 n.8.

supra note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41556.
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the geographic market must be expanded to include that firm.180 If,
however, a firm outside the region could not prevent that price increase, then the firm is excluded and the initial region alone constitutes the geographic market. 181 Thus, a narrowly defined geographic
market with a limited number of hospitals could substantially limit
consumer choice; however, a broadly defined geographic market
could imply that patients are willing to travel to visit the doctor of
their choice. 182 Therefore, a precise definition is necessary to protect
consumers.
(2)

Composition of the Geographic Market

(a)

Third-Party Payors

One aspect of the uniqueness of the hospital market-the heavy
influence of third-party payors-is particularly relevant when defining
the geographic market. 183 Competition makes it easier for health
plans, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider networks (PPOs), "to steer their enrollees towards
those hospitals that offer the most attractive contract terms."184 The
benefits that the health plan receives are designed to pass to the thirdparty payors' consumers, employers, and employees. 185 Therefore,
when determining the geographic market, it is also important to ask
whether health plans, in the face of a price increase, would steer their
enrollees to hospitals outside that region so that the monopolist
would find the price increase unprofitable. 186

(b)

Patients and Patient Flow Data

The geographic market does not only consider health plans. It also
consists of patients in the form of patient flow data, showing where
each discharged patient lives. 187 One variant of patient flow data is
the Elzinga-Hogarty (E-H) approach, which examines the numbers of
"import" patients and "export" patients from one region to an180.
181.
182.
183.

184.
185.
186.
187.

[d. at 41555.
[d.
See infra Part V.C.1.b.(3).
See Gregory S. Vistnes, Defining Geographic Markets for Hospital Mergers, 13
ANTITRUST 28,28 (1999). Dr. Vistnes was the Deputy Director for Antitrust,

Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
[d.
[d.
See id.

[d. at 31.
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other. 188 The premise of the E-H approach states that if a few consumers are willing to go to another region, then more consumers will
cross boundaries in the event of a price increase. 189 As applied to
hospitals, the E-H approach requires a small amount of patient outflow and inflow from another region. 190
A variant of the E-H approach is the zip code approach, which involves identifYing the zip codes of where a given percentage of residents travel to hospitals outside the region for health care
services. 191 The rationale behind the contestable zip code approach is
similar to that of the E-H approach-if some patients are willing to
use outside hospitals, other patients, in contestable zip codes, will also
use hospitals outside the region, in the event of a price increase. 192
The court in United States v. Mercy Health Services193 used the zip code
approach to define a very broad geographic market. 194 Mercy Health
Center and Finley Hospital, the only two general acute-care hospitals
in Dubuque, Iowa, agreed to merge. 195 The DO] asserted that the
geographic market consisted of a "half-circle with a 15 mile radius"
that included Mercy, Finley, and one of seven rural hospitals. 196 The
hospitals contended that the relevant geographic market comprised a
70 to 100 mile area which included Mercy, Finley, the seven closest
rural hospitals, and the regional hospitals located in Cedar Rapids,
Waterloo, Iowa City, Davenport and Madison. 197
The court criticized the DOl's reliance on the E-H test, stating that
the test is only a starting point that indicates current conditions; it
does not consider what would happen if one of the market participants attempted to exercise market power. 198 Considering the de188. See id. The E-H approach rests on the notion that there should be few "imports" and few "exports." See id.
189. See Vistnes, supra note 183, at 28.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id. A contestable zip code is a zip code where residents may choose one
of several hospitals. The percentage of residents that consistently go to one
hospital (over another hospital in the area) is low.
193. 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).
The case was vacated because the hospitals ultimately decided not to
merge.
194. Id. at 979-80.
195. Id. at 971.
196. Id. at 976.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 978.
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tailed zip code analysis provided by the hospitals,199 the court
determined that the government failed to establish a relevant geographic market. 200 Therefore, it held that the government failed to
prove that the merger would result in anticompetitive effects. 201
In contrast, the court in United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical
Center 02 discredited patient origin data. 203 An expert for the DOJ defined the geographic market as a region approximately five miles
from the merging hospitals. 204 The hospitals, Long Island Jewish
Medical Center and North Shore Manhasset, defined the geographic
market according to patient origin data. 205
Rejecting both parties' definitions, the court stated, "[a]s is often
the case with such complex, fact sensitive issues, the reality lies somewhere between the two versions."206 It further indicated that both the
DOJ and the hospitals oversimplified the issue, each for their own
benefit. 207 The court concluded that two geographic markets existed:
the first for primary and secondary care and the second for tertiary
care. 208
While the E-H and patient inflow data approaches have flaws, agencies and hospitals still use them. 209 Despite the relatively high patient
inflow and outflow in the Long Island Jewish Medical Center and
North Shore Manhasset merger, the DOl's decision to challenge those
mergers suggests that the government is giving less weight to patient
flow analyses. 210 Based on the above mentioned holdings, however,
199. Id. at 979-80 (indicating that hospitals outside the DOl's defined area were
attracting patients).
200. Id. at 987 (accepting the hospitals' 70 to 100 mile geographic market
definition) .
20l. Mercy, 902 F. Supp. at 987.
202. 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
203. Id. at 14l.
204. Id. at 140. Both hospitals were located on Long Island,just a short distance
from Manhattan. Id. at 125.
205. Id. at 141 (showing that the hospitals drew patients from Queens, Nassau,
and Suffolk, and "that patients residing in these areas seek health care in
western Suffolk, Nassau, Queens, and Manhattan").
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. !d. at 141-42. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text for an explanation of primary, secondary and tertiary care.
209. See, e.g., United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 978 (N.D.
Iowa 1995), vacated 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that the government relied too heavily on "past health care conditions" and that the E-H
test is merely a starting point in determining the actual geographic market); Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 134.
2lO. See Vistnes, supra note 183, at 33.
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courts appear willing to accept both approaches or, at least, to consider both approaches. 211 Thus, the Agencies should not solely rely
on patient flow data, but should construct their cases around ensuring
that consumers have a range of choices in a competitive market.
(3)

Defining the Geographic Market Fails to Protect Consumer
Choice

The geographic market in a hospital merger case is not as easily
defined as the product market. A geographic market can consist of
several different consumers, namely patients and third-party payors or
health plans, which could include employers, employees and government payors. 212 The definition of the geographic market can depend
on the number of additional hospitals in the area, the availability of
alternatives, and the definition of consumers.213 In any case, the geographic market should be based on a variety of information and evidence that is market and fact-specific. 214
Further, patients can be forgotten during the process of defining
the geographic market. 215 Courts do consider patients and third-party
payors as consumers of hospital services. 216 Patients, however, have
much less leverage with hospitals. Conversely, third-party payors have
very powerful leverage with hospitals. 217 Managed care payors have
the ability to negotiate contracts for services with hospitals and are
more concerned with lower prices. 218 Some patients may also be con211. See, e.g., Mercy, 902 F. Supp. at 977-78 (analyzing, then criticizing the government's use of the E-H test); Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 134 ("[A]s is
often the case with such complex, fact sensitive issues, the reality lies somewhere in between the two versions."); see also Vistnes, supra note 183, at 33.
212. See Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 134; see also Vistnes, supra note 183, at 33.
213. See Baker, supra note 14, at 141-43.
214. See Vistnes, supra note 183, at 33.
215. See id. at 28 (indicating that "while health plans' enrollees (as well as the
employers who contract with the health plans) affect how health plans will
respond to hospital price increases, individual enrollees are generally not
viewed as the buyer [of health care services] under a Guidelines analysis of
a hospital merger").
216. See Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 134; see also Vistnes, supra note 183, at 28.
While Dr. Vistnes indicates that the geographic market definition depends
on health plans, he also notes that patient flow data is also used in determining the definition, thereby conceding that patients are also consumers.
Id.
217. See Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 134 (indicating that managed care plans are
driving hospital decisions on whether to merge, on what services to provide, and concerning prices).
218. See United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 973-74 (N.D.
Iowa 1995), vacated 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997) (indicating that MCOs
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cerned about the escalating costs of health care services, while others
are more concerned about being able to see the doctor of their
choice, obtaining the services they desire or need, or going to the
hospital of their choice. 219
In addition, payors may exacerbate the problems patients experience. Although payors are supposed to pass benefits onto their consumers, this does not always happen, as payors are very conscious of
the bottom line. 220 Payors are able to direct patients to other facilities
and physicians,221 even though those facilities and physicians may not
be the patient's choice.
For example, a cancer patient's doctor only has privileges at a recently merged hospital, and the payor has a contract with that merged
hospital, but the hospital has raised its prices. If a patient requires
chemotherapy, the payor may refuse to pay for the services if those
services are performed by the doctor of the patient's choice at the
hospital of the patient's choice. Subsequently, either the patient pays
for the treatments out of the patient's own pocket, or the patient is
"steered" by the payor to a different hospital with lower prices. 222
A merger with a broadly defined geographic market will be harder
to challenge. 223 A large market means that a larger number of competing providers are deemed alternative, sufficient substitutes and
thus can provide similar services. 224 This implies that consumers are
willing to travel long distances to receive the required treatment.
Therefore, a successful challenge will require evidence indicating that
patients in need of services will not travel long distances due to the
costs, or that the nature of the services needed is time-sensitive, or that

219.
220.
221.
222.

223.
224.

shop on the basis of price and are able to induce hospitals to discount
charges in return for the payor's promise to direct more patients to the
hospital, and that MCOs will negotiate the best rates and greatest discounts
with hospitals). Individual patients clearly do not have this level ofleverage
with hospitals.
See United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir.
1990).
See Mercy, 902 F. Supp. at 974.
See Vistnes, supra note 183, at 28.
See generally Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisc. v. Marshfield Clinic,
65 F.3d 1406, 14lO, 1412 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting "[g]enerally you must pay
more for higher quality" and "the HMO's incentive is to keep you healthy if
it can but if you get very sick, and are unlikely to recover to a healthy state
involving few medical expenses, to let you die as quickly and cheaply as
possible").
See APPELBAUM, supra note 6, at 18.
See id.

2000]

Hospital Mergers Versus Consumers

101

the patient is unfamiliar with a distant area. 225 In sum, the basis for a
challenge of this nature should be patient choice.
(4)

Market Share, Market Concentration, and Market Power

When evaluating a merger, the Agencies will calculate market
shares for all firms in the relevant market. 226 The market share of
each firm is calculated for the firm's future competitive significance. 227
The Agencies will also calculate market concentration, which is a
function of the number of firms in a relevant market and their respective market shares. 228 The Agencies use the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index ("HHI") to calculate market concentration. 229 The spectrum of
market concentration is divided into three parts: (1) unconcentrated
if the HHI is below 1,000; (2) moderately concentrated if the HHI is
between 1,000 and 1,800; and (3) highly concentrated if the HHI is
above 1,800. 230 The Agencies also consider the post-merger market
concentration and the increase in HHI resulting from the merger. 231
Mergers resulting in an HHI increase of 100 points or more raise concerns of potential anticompetitive behavior. 232
The merger of two hospitals in a three or four hospital market may
create a presumption of anticompetitive effects. However, a merger
does not necessarily have to create market power in order for the FTC
to look into the legality of the acquisition. One of the most important
hospital mergers cases analyzed under the Clayton Act, Hospital Corporation of America v. FTC,233 illustrates this point.
225. See id. For example, in a Catholic/non-Catholic hospital merger, the Agencies would have to show that patients in need of reproductive health services could not, or would not, travel longer distances to obtain these
services. See id. In addition, the Agencies would have to show that the reason patients could not travel is due to the time-sensitive nature of the service needed (Le., the "morning-after" pill or postpartum tubal ligation). See
id.
226. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41557.
227. ld. Possible indicators include dollar sales, unit sales and physical capacity.
ld.
228. ld.
229. ld. "HHI is calculated by summing the squares of' each participant's market share. ld.
230. ld.
231. ld. at 41558. The increase in HHI is calculated by multiplying the market
shares of the merging firms together, then multiplying that number by two.
ld. at n.l8.
232. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. § 1.51.
233. 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986).
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Hospital Corporation of America ("HCA") owned one hospital in
Chattanooga, Tennessee, and through the acquisitions of two health
care corporations, it acquired two more hospitals. 234 In addition,
HCA assumed contracts to manage two other hospitals in the same
locale. 235 Mter the acquisitions, HCA owned or managed five of
eleven hospitals in the Chattanooga area. 236
The FTC challenged the acquisitions under section 7 of the Clayton
Act. 237 The FTC concluded that the acquisitions could substantially
lessen competition in the Chattanooga hospital market. 238 In addition, the FTC indicated that hospital mergers would not be analyzed
differently from mergers involving other industries. 239
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that the decisions in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,240 United
States v. Aluminum Co. of A merica, 241 United States v. Von's Grocery CO.,242
and United States v. Pabst Brewing CO.,243
[s]eemed, taken as a group, to establish the illegality of any
nontrivial acquisition of a competitor, whether or not the acquisition was likely either to bring about or shore up collusive or oligopoly pricing. The elimination of a significant
rival was thought by itself to infringe the complex of social
and economic values conceived by a majority of the Court to
inform the statutory words "may ... substantially ... lessen
competition. "244
In addition, the court noted that all that is necessary to initiate an
inquiry under section 7 of the Clayton Act is that the merger creates
an "appreciable danger" of higher prices in the future. 245
The court also determined that the evidence supported the FTC's
conclusion that the acquisitions were likely to encourage collusive
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 1383.
Id. at 1383-84.
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1383.
Id. The acquisitions did not result in a firm of monopoly proportions. See
Miles & Philp, supra note 75, at 661 (referring to FTC record at 3 TRADE
REG. REp. (CCH) ~ 22,301 (FTC Oct. 25, 1985».
See Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986).
370 u.s. 294 (1962).
377 u.s. 271 (1964).
384 U.S. 270 (1966).
384 U.S. 546 (1966).
Hospital Corp. oj Am., 807 F.2d at 1385.
Hospital Corp. oj Am., 807 F.2d at 1389.
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practices that would hann consumers. 246 The court reached its decision by validating what the FTC found. 247 First, the market was highly
concentrated. 248 Second, a reduction in the number of competitors
made it easier for the remaining hospitals to collude or coordinate
pricing. 249 Third, the Chattanooga area hospitals had a documented
history of collusion. 250 Fourth, the hospital market lacked competitive
alternatives. 251 Fifth, the demand for hospital services is inelastic
under competitive conditions. 252 Finally, in order to resist pressure
from the federal government to cut costs, the hospitals could (and
did) present a united front,253 even without a monopoly share of the
market.
Therefore, a monopoly share of the market is not necessarily a prerequisite for the FTC to invalidate a merger. The focus should be on
the effects the merger has on consumers, given the power hospitals
have over them. 254 As mentioned previously, consumers have very little leverage as compared with managed care organizations and thirdparty payors to deal with hospitals. 255 Philadelphia National Bank and
246. Id. at 1389. The only question before the court was whether the evidence
was sufficient to substantiate the FTC's finding. Id. at 1385. It is irrelevant
that the court may find differently. Id. at 1386.
247. Id. at 1389.
248. Id. at 1384 (indicating that HCA's market share rose from 14% to 26% as a
result of the acquisitions and made it the second largest health care provider in a market where the four largest firms had 91 % of the market
share).
249. Id. at 1387. The court added that the consequence of collusion would be
the creation of excess capacity because higher prices would cause some patients to shorten their stay and others to postpone, or even reject, elective
surgery. Id.
250. Id. at 1388 (noting that since the hospitals were prone to cooperate, they
would be prone to collude, and that the management contracts gave HCA
virtual control over pricing and other decisions).
251. Id. (suggesting that: (1) going to a nearby city is often out of the question
in medical emergencies; (2) doctors will not send patients to another city
where the doctor does not have hospital privileges; and (3) most hospital
services cannot be provided by non-hospital providers).
252. Id. (reasoning that people place a high value on their safety, doctors make
most treatment decisions for their patients, and insurance companies or
the federal government, not the patient, pay most medical bills). A lower
elasticity of demand enables providers to make more profits by raising
prices through collusion. Id.
253. !d. at 1389 (suggesting that through this form of collusion, hospitals are
able to frustrate efforts to control hospital costs).
254. See supra Part II.B.1.
255. See supra notes 183-86, 220-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
heavy influence of third-party payors.
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Tidewater Marine Services suggest that consumers should be considered
when testing the competitive market under section 7 of the Clayton
Act. 256

(5)

Entry Barriers in the Hospital Market

Ease of entry is not usually addressed in hospital merger cases, however, entry into the hospital market is generally difficult. Entry is
often controlled by state imposed CON laws. 257 In order for a company to build a new hospital and enter the market, it must go through
an arduous process, which can take as long as two to three years. 258
The state health facility's regulatory agency must approve the addition
of any new facility, service, or beds. 259 CON laws are essentially state
imposed entry barriers. 26o
2.

Efficiencies Created by a Merger

a.

Efficiencies as Defined by the Agencies

The Agencies recognize that a merger may create significant efficiencies that permit better utilization of assets and enable the merged
256. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 19-123 (1999 and Supp. 2000).
See supra note 49 and infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text for an
explanation of CON.
258. In Maryland, for example, a company wishing to build a new facility would
first write a letter of intent, which is valid for 180 days. A formal application
must be filed with the Maryland Health Care Commission (formerly the
Maryland Health Resources Planning Commission) within this 180 day period. The Commission Staff then reviews the application within ten days of
submission, and may request additional information if necessary. After the
application is complete and docketed, the applicant has fifteen days from
receipt of the comments to file a written response. The Commission Staff
then prepares a recommended decision. Interested parties who previously
submitted written comments may also submit written exceptions to the proposed decision. The applicant and interested parties have an opportunity
to present oral arguments on the proposed decision before the full Commission. The Commission must make a final decision on the application
within 150 days of being docketed. After the administrative review process
has been exhausted, parties may then seek relief from the courts. See
COMAR 10.24.01 (1978 and Supp. 1999).
259. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II, § 19-103 (2000). In Maryland, the Maryland Health Care Commission would have to approve the new hospital.
In addition, the Health Services Cost Review Commission would be involved. Both of these agencies are under the umbrella of the Maryland
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.
260. FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991).

2000]

Hospital Mergers Versus Consumers

105

finn to achieve lower costs. 261 If the FTC establishes a prima facie
case of potential anticompetitive behavior, then the hospitals may
overcome this presumption by demonstrating that efficiencies, resulting from the merger, offset any anticompetitive effects. 262 The Agencies, however, will only consider those efficiencies likely to be
achieved with the merger and unlikely to be achieved without the
merger. 263
The Guidelines indicate that efficiencies are difficult to verify and
quantity because only the merging finns possess the infonnation relating to the efficiencies, and that despite being projected in good faith,
the efficiencies may not be realized. 264 Therefore, the merging finns
must substantiate their efficiency claims so they can be reasonably verified by the Agencies. 265
The FTC and DO] will only consider cognizable, merger-specific efficiencies. 266 These are efficiencies that are of sufficient "character
and magnitude" to offset any anticompetitive effects of the merger. 267
If they have been verified and do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in service or output, then the Agencies will not challenge the
merger. 268
The Agencies must detennine whether the efficiencies would reverse potential harm to the consumers in the relevant market. 269 If
the potential adverse effects of the merger are great, the cognizable
efficiencies must be comparable to prevent the merger from being
anticompetitive. 270
261. See Revision to HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4, 1997 WL 166999 (Apr.
8, 1997). Only section 4 was revised in 1997. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id. Verification of efficiencies by reasonable means involves an assessment of: (1) the likelihood and magnitude of each efficiency; (2) how and
when each efficiency will be accomplished; (3) how each efficiency will enhance the firm's ability to compete; and (4) why each efficiency is mergerspecific. Id.; see also Debra A. Valentine, Address at St. Louis University
School of Law Conference on Antitrust and Health Care: Current Antitrust
Issues for the Health Care Provider (Nov. 14, 1997) in 1997 WL 721916
(F.T.C.).
266. See MERGER GUIDELINES, 4 Trade Reg. Reps. ~ 13,104 (1992) (with April 8,
1997 revision to § 4).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 266, ~ 13,104.
270. See id. ("The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger ...
the greater must be cognizable efficiencies in order for the Agency to con-
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Nevertheless, the Agencies do find some efficiencies more acceptable than others. 271 For example, the Guidelines state that "efficiencies resulting from shifting production among facilities formerly
owned separately, which enable the merging firms to reduce the marginal cost of production, are more likely to be susceptible to verification, merger-specific, and substantial, and are less likely to result from
anticompetitive reductions in outpUt."272 This explains why efficiencies in hospital merger cases are given great deference. In particular,
the FTC Chairman, Robert Pitofsky, said that the hospital industry is
an area where efficiencies can be of great significance. 273
b.

The Deference Given to the Efficiencies Defense Fails to Protect Consumer
Choice

Most courts follow the two-part test established in University Health
when analyzing an efficiencies defense. 274 The merging hospitals
must prove that: (1) the acquisition will result in significant efficiencies; and (2) these efficiencies will be passed on to consumers.275
Applying the University Health test, the court in FTC v. Butterworth
Health Corp.,276 denied the FTC's motion for an injunction and allowed Butterworth Health Corporation and Blodgett Memorial Medical Center to merge. 277 The court determined that the relevant
market, as alleged by the FTC, consisted of general acute-care and
primary-care inpatient hospital services in the Greater Kent County
area. 278 The court accepted the FTC's market concentration analysis,

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

277.

278.

clude that the merger will not have an anticompetitive effect in the relevant
market.").
See id.
Id.
Raskin & Zessar, supra note 21, at 22.
See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir 1991).
Id.
946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd in unpublished opinion, 121 F.3d
708 (6th Cir. 1997) (table).
Id. at 1303. Butterworth and Blodgett were two of four general acute care
hospitals in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Id. at 1288. Both hospitals were nonprofit and offered comprehensive medical and surgical care, consisting of
primary, secondary, and tertiary care services. Id. The Hillman Commission recommended that Blodgett reorganize its existing facilities by consolidating inpatient services with other area hospitals. Id. Subsequently,
Blodgett and Butterworth initiated discussion and eventually decided to
merge. !d. The FTC sought an injunction to block the merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. (alleging that the proposed merger would
substantially lessen competition).
Id. at 1291. "Greater Kent County" included Grand Rapids and the area
within a thirty mile radius of Grand Rapids; in total, this area contained
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which indicated that the proposed merger would result in a significant
increase in the concentration of power in two significant markets. 279
Further, the court concluded that the FTC established a prima facie
case that the merger would violate section 7. 280
Butterworth and Blodgett used an efficiencies defense to rebut the
presumption of illegality established by the FTC's prima facie case. 281
Blodgett and Butterworth estimated that their capital expenditures
would be $187 million and $73.9 million, respectively (for a total of
$260.9 million), if the merger was blocked, and, collectively, only total
$161.7 million if the merger was allowed to proceed. 282 In addition,
the hospitals estimated that they would save $68.5 million in operating
expenditures during the first five years following the merger. 283
Despite the FTC's contention that the hospitals' estimates were
over-exaggerated, the court, noting that the savings would be passed
on to consumers, accepted the efficiencies defense. 284 In reaching its
decision, the court also relied on the hospitals' "Community Commitment," in which the hospitals committed to freeze prices, limit margins, and provide medical services to the underserved and the
medically needy.285 In addition, the court relied on the hospitals'

279.

280.
281.

282.
283.
284.

285.

nine hospitals, all of which provided general acute care inpatient services.
Id.
Id. at 1294. According to this analysis, the hospitals would have a 47 to 67%
market share of the general acute care inpatient services, and the postmerger HHI would range from 2,767 to 4,521. Id. (depending on whether
that market share was measured in terms of licensed beds, discharges, or
inpatient revenues and indicating an expected increase of between 1,064
and 1,889 points). Further, a post-merger HHI of greater than 1,800 is considered to indicate a highly concentrated market. Id. A merger which results in an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points is considered "likely
to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise." Id. For a
more detailed discussion of HHI, see supra notes 229-32 and accompanying
text. The hospitals would also have a 65 to 70% market share of the primary care inpatient hospital market, and the post-merger HHI would range
between 4,506 and 5,079. Id.
Id.
Id. at 1300 (noting that evidence of efficiencies benefiting consumers is
useful in evaluating the merger's overall effect on competition); see also University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1222.
Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1300-01 (indicating a capital expenditure savings of $99.2 million in the event of the merger).
Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1301.
Id. (indicating that the efficiencies, in the form of capital expenditure
avoidance and operating efficiencies, would be passed on to consumers,
given the hospitals' non-profit status and the Community Commitment).
Id. at 1298.
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non-profit status and gave substantial weight to the evidence,
presented by the hospitals, indicating that mergers of non-profit hospitals tend to reduce costs. 286
The court went even further to criticize the FTC's analysis of the
efficiencies defense presented by the hospitals. 287 The court concluded that the FTC failed to show that the hospitals would exercise
their market power to the detriment of consumers,288 and that the
public interest was best served by allowing the hospitals to merge. 289
Similarly, the defendants in United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical
Center,290 successfully asserted the efficiencies defense to defeat the
federal government's claim of an illegal merger. Long Island Jewish
Medical Center and North Shore Health Systems decided to merge. 291
Both hospitals, located only two miles apart, were non-profit teaching
institutions that delivered primary, secondary, and tertiary care. 292
The court determined that the consumers in this case consisted of:
(1) patients who self-payor have indemnity insurance; (2) physicians
and physician groups who exercise control over the selection of the
hospital network; (3) managed care plans; (4) employers who exert
control over the selection of a hospital network; and (5) government
payors, such as Medicare and Medicaid. 293 The court defined the relevant product market as general acute-care inpatient hospital services. 294 It also determined the relevant geographic market to be: (1)
primary and secondary care provided by the two hospitals in Queens
and Nassau; and (2) tertiary care provided in Manhattan, Queens,
Nassau, and western Suffolk County.295 The court did not find any
anticompetitive effects of the merger, such as reduced service to, or
286. Id. at 1295-1302. But see Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390
(7th Cir. 1986) (indicating that non-profit status does not mean the firm
will refrain from acting in an anticompetitive manner, and that non-profit
status does not necessarily demonstrate the firm's willingness to cooperate
in reducing prices).
287. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1302 (giving deference to the hospitals' efficiency analysis and condemning the FTC's mere critique of the hospitals'
analysis).
288. Id. at 1302.
289. Id. at 1303.
290. 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
291. Id. at 125. Long IslandJewish Medical Center is located in eastern Queens
County. See id. North Shore Manhasset, the major hospital in the North
Shore System, is located in northwestern Nassau County. See id.
292. Id.
293. Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 134.
294. Id. at 139.
295. Id. at 141-42 (noting that some residents of Queens, Nassau and Suffolk will
go to Manhattan for treatment).

2000]

Hospital Mergers Versus Consumers

109

treatment of patients. 296 The court reached this conclusion despite
both hospitals being teaching hospitals, direct competitors, and potential acquisition targets of MCOS.297
Although the court did not have to proceed with its discussion, as it
determined that the DO] failed to establish that the merger would
result in a substantial lessening of competition in any relevant market,
the court went on to discuss the efficiencies that further supported its
decision. 298 Despite the fact that the DO] successfully disproved some
of the claimed efficiencies, the court agreed with the hospitals that
the merger would create substantial efficiencies, noting, however, that
the amount of savings directly relating to the merger was difficult to
ascertain. 299 In addition, the court relied on the hospitals' written
agreement with the Attorney General of New York, indicating their
commitment to pass savings onto the community.30o
Long Island and Butterworth are examples of the deference given to
hospitals' efficiencies defense. 301 In particular, both courts gave great
weight to the hospitals' written commitment to their respective communities. These written commitments contained promises to maintain prices and to continue to serve the poor and indigent
population. 302
Although the DO] did not succeed in establishing a prima facie case
in Long Island, the court explained that the efficiency defense was still
sufficient to warrant discussion and approval. In Butterworth, the FTC
established a prima facie case; however, the court determined that the
hospitals' efficiencies defense successfully rebutted the presumption
of illegality.303
It appears, from these cases, that a written community commitment
is sufficient to overcome a merger challenge. These types of commitments, however, are not binding on a hospital. While the community
(consumers) may pressure the hospital to abide by its commitment,
third-party payors may also exert pressure on the hospital. As discussed, these organizations have much greater leverage than consumers, and can more easily and effectively cause the hospital to limit
consumer choice.
296. Id. at 142 (indicating, however, that the DO] failed to show a lack of alternatives if prices increased).
297. Id. at 145.
298. Id. at 146-49.
299. Id. at 148.
300. Id. at 149; FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1301 (W.D.
Mich. 1996).
301. See Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 149; Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 130l.
302. See Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 126-27; Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1298.
303. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1302.
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Moreover, the American Hospital Association (AHA) recently conducted a study to examine hospital mergers in the 1980s and 1990s to
assess how the effects of increased market power balanced against increased economic efficiency.304 The study addressed two questions:
(1) to what extent and under what circumstances have hospital mergers improved efficiency; and (2) who benefits from hospital mergers-consumers in terms of lower prices, hospitals in terms of greater
profits, or both?305
The study indicates that the top five reasons hospitals merge are:
(1) to strengthen their financial position; (2) to achieve operating efficiencies; (3) to consolidate services; (4) to expand market share; and
(5) to expand access to care. 306 The second and third reasons relate
directly to efficiencies. The fourth reason, to expand market share, is
especially noteworthy in a merger analysis.
The study found that 58% of acquired hospitals continued to offer
acute inpatient care following a merger, but 17% of the acquired hospitals closed. 307 While closure may be "efficient," it can severely limit
consumer choice.
The AHA study concluded that "hospital mergers offer opportunities for achieving efficiencies through a variety of means."308 While
the strategies for achieving efficiencies varied, none were universally
adopted, and most depended on the organizational structure of the
merging hospitals. 3og
c.

FTC v. Staples: The Agencies Preferred Efficiency Analysis Which Protects
Consumers

The FTC indicated that it prefers an analysis of the efficiencies defense in accordance with FTC v. Staples, Inc. 310 In 1996, Staples and
Office Depot entered into an agreement whereby Marlin Acquisition
Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Staples, "would merge with
and into Office Depot, and Office Depot would become a whollyowned subsidiary of Staples."311 At that time, Office Depot and
Staples were the first and second largest office superstore chains, re304. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL AsSOCIATION, EFFECTS OF HOSPITAL MERGERS ON
MARKET POWER AND EFFICIENCIES, at http://www.aha.org/hret/r_ehm.asp
(last visited Jan. 9, 2000).

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id.
Id. at Exhibit l.
Id. at Exhibit 2.
Id. at Discussion and Conclusion.
Id.
970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Valentine, supra note 265, at *6.
The FTC was successful in preventing the Staples-Office Depot merger.

31l. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1069.
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spectively, in the United States. SI2 The FTC sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the merger under the FTC Act. SIS In order to
succeed on a motion for preliminary injunction, the FTC only had to
prove that there was a "reasonable probability" that the challenged
merger would have anticompetitive effects. 314
The FTC defined the relevant geographic market as forty-two metropolitan areas where consumers could practically turn for alternatives and where the defendants faced competition. 315 The defendants
did not dispute the FTC's definition and the court, therefore, accepted the geographic market as defined by the FTC. 3I6 The court
found that the relevant product market was the sale of office supplies
through office supply superstores. 317 The court also found that the
merger would allow Staples to increase prices or maintain prices at an
anticompetitive level because the merger would effectively eliminate
Staples' only rival and competition. 318
As to the efficiencies, the court found that the defendants' efficiencies defense did not rebut the presumption that the merger would
have anticompetitive effects. 319 The defendants submitted an "Efficiencies Analysis" in support of its asserted savings between $4.9 and
$6.5 billion over the first five years of the merger. 320 Staples and Office Depot argued that as suppliers became more efficient, the suppliers would be able to lower prices to other retailers, and also that twothirds of the savings realized by the merged Staples and Office Depot
would be passed on to consumers. 321
As evidenced in the opinion, the court looked closely at the credibility of the defendants' documents. 322 First, the court indicated that
the cost savings were unreliable because the numbers were inflated by
almost 500%.323 Second, the court determined that the savings were
unverified, or at least the defendants neglected to produce the imper312. Id.
313. Id. (pending the FTC's final determination in its administrative proceedings to determine whether the merger would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
314. Id. at 1072. Accord FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th
Cir 1991).
315. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1073.
316. Id.
317. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1080.
318. Id. at 1082.
319. Id. at 1090.
320. Id. at 1089.
321. Id.
322. See id.
323. Id.
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ative documentation for verification. 324 Third, the defendants did not
precisely calculate which savings were merger-specific. 325 Fourth, the
defendants' methodology in making some of the projected savings was
problematic. 326 Finally, the court determined that the two-thirds savings projected to be passed on to consumers was unrealistic. 327
Given the court's detailed analysis of the defendants' projected efficiencies, it is clear why the FTC prefers an analysis of this sort. In
addition, the defendants' evidence was highly inflated,328 catching the
immediate attention of the court. The apparent inaccuracies of the
defendants' efficiency evidence indicate the difficulty in presenting,
and winning, an efficiencies defense and the need for the most accurate information possible.
d.

What the Agencies can do to Protect Consumers

Although hospitals do not technically "produce" anything, they do
offer services. When hospitals merge, they either consolidate all services in one facility and close the remaining facility, or they offer certain services at one facility and different services at the other
facility.329 In either case, the services are consolidated to reduce duplication and costs. 330 However, the question remains whether the
consolidation is "efficient" given that patients may lose their ability to
choose.
The efficiencies defense presented by hospitals may be the most difficult obstacle the FTC and DO] must overcome in order to protect
consumer choice. The Agencies should use the Staples case as a model
to rebut efficiencies offered by the merging hospitals. In accordance
with Staples, the Agencies should: (1) ensure that cost savings are reliable; (2) verifY those savings; (3) separate merger-specific savings from
those savings that can be achieved without a merger; (4) define a
methodology for calculating savings; and (5) ensure that the savings,
which will be passed to the consumers, are reliable.
Considering the deference courts give to merging hospital's "community commitment" plans, the Agencies should carefully scrutinize
these plans in accordance with a model rebuttal that they adopt. The
324. Id. at 1089-90 (noting that the defendants' efficiencies witness was unable
to explain the methods used to calculate many of the savings).
325. Id. at 1090 (indicating that some of the projected efficiencies could be realized without the merger).
326. Id. (noting that cost savings from select vendors were extrapolated to all
vendors).
327. Id. (indicating that Staples' historical pass through rate is only 15 to 17%).
328. Id. at 1089-90.
329. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
330. See Choslovsky, supra note 24, at 292, 296.
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most accurate information possible is the key to a successful rebuttal
by the Agencies. More importantly, consumers should be the center
of each step of the rebuttal.
In addition, given the strong influence of managed care, the Agencies should question whether projected savings will actually be passed
to consumers or whether the savings will ultimately be usurped by the
MCOs. Consumers have far less bargaining power with hospitals,
while MCOs directly negotiate rates and reimbursement. In the event
that an MCO reduces the reimbursement for a hospital, the hospital
and consumers are required to pay more, thereby effectively reducing
any savings that should have passed to consumers.
In sum, if merging hospitals are unable to specifically identify and
quantify the efficiencies resulting from a merger, they should not be
allowed to limit consumer choice. In order to prevent hospitals from
limiting consumer choice, the Agencies must present a stronger case
against the merger. Again, the focus of any challenge should be ensuring and protecting consumer choice.
VI.

THE RURAL EXCEPTION: THE UKIAH CASE AND ITS IMPACT ON CONSUMERS

The 1996 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Healthcare
provide an exception for hospital mergers in rural areas. 331 The
Agencies recognize that rural hospitals with less than 100 beds and
fewer than a daily average of 40 inpatients are unlikely to achieve efficiencies enjoyed by larger hospitals. 332 Some of those cost-saving efficiencies may be realized, however, through a merger with another
hospital. 333 The 1996 Statements indicate that rural hospitals are
more likely to achieve economies of scale if they are allowed to
merge. 334 This exception further undermines consumer choice. A recent California case further explains the rural exception.
331. 1996 DOJ/FTC STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH
CARE, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.htm. at Statement 1.
Statement 1 provides:
The Agencies recognize that in some cases a general acute care
hospital with fewer than lOO licensed beds and an average daily
inpatient census of fewer than 40 patients will be the only hospital
in a relevant market. As such, the hospital does not compete in any
significant way with other hospitals. Accordingly, mergers involving such hospitals are unlikely to reduce competition substantially.
[d.

332. [d.
333. [d.
334. [d.
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Ukiah, California is located in Mendocino County in a valley separated by the Coastal Range from the Pacific Ocean. 335 Nearby towns
include Willits, twenty-three miles to the north, and Lakeport, thirtyfour miles to the southeast. 336 The closest urban centers are Santa
Rosa, sixty miles to the south, and San Francisco, 120 miles away.337
Ukiah was originally the home to three hospitals, however one
closed in 1992.338 The only two remaining hospitals located in Ukiah
were Ukiah Adventist Hospital (UAR) and Ukiah General Hospital
(UGH).339 Two other small hospitals, both offering primary care services, were located in Willits and Lakeport. 34o The largest hospitals in
the area included those in Santa Rosa and San Francisco. 341
In 1988, UAR entered into an agreement to purchase UGH.342
UAR was a forty-three bed hospital that offered primary care services
and some ancillary services, but no obstetrical services. 343 UGH was a
fifty-one bed hospital that offered similar services, but also included
an obstetrical unit and neonatal care services. 344 The FTC Staff challenged the merger on the basis that it violated section 7 of the Clayton
Act bec'ause Adventist Health System/West ("ARS/West") controlled
three of five area hospitals, including UAR.345
In determining the relevant geographic market, the FTC Commission examined the likely response of health insurance plans, patients,
patient discharge statistics, alternative hospitals, and physician privi335. Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. 224, 285 (1994). This case was challenged and reviewed according to the FTC's administrative process. The
FTC Staff first brought the case before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
Mter the ALJ dismissed the case, the Staff appealed to the FTC Commission. It was not subsequently litigated in court. Accordingly, "FTC Staff'
refers to the FTC employees challenging the merger. "FTC Commission"
refers to the administrative panel that rendered this decision.
336. [d.
337. [d.
338. [d, at 286-87.
339. [d. at 286.
340. [d. at 287.
341. [d.
342. [d. at 286. UAH was managed and controlled by Adventist Health System/
West (AHS/West). [d.
343. [d. at 286-87.
344. [d.
345. See Erwin A. Blackstone and Joseph P. Fuhr,Jr., Rural Hospital Mergers, Antitrust Policy, and the Ukiah Case, 23 J. HEALTH POLITICS POL'y & L. 949,955-56
(1998). The merger of UAH and UGH increased AHS/West's market
share from 38% to 71 % and increased the HHI from about 3,100 to 5,600.
See id. at 955-56; Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. at 288-97.
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leges. 346 The FTC Staff argued that the relevant geographic area was
Ukiah-Willits-Lakeport, or in the alternative Ukiah-Willits. 347 The
FTC Commission, and, previously, the Administrative Law Judge rejected this argument. 348
First, the FTC agreed that insurers are sensitive to price increases,
and as a result, may seek to steer patients to lower cost hospitals. 349
The FTC Commission could not, however, determine from the record
the degree of price sensitivity that would undermine an anticompetitive price increase. 35o Second, the FTC determined, according to E-H
statistics, that the geographic market was not confined to the UkiahWillits-Lakeport area. 351 Finally, the FTC Commission determined
that there was no plausible reason to exclude Lakeport from the
Ukiah-Willits geographic market. 352
The decision stated that the FTC Staff failed to prove that UkiahWillits-Lakeport or Ukiah-Willits were the relevant geographic markets,353 although what is not stated in the decision is equally as important. The decision implicitly supports wide geographic markets for
rural hospitals. 354 In addition, the willingness of 25% of Ukiah residents to travel to distant areas for health care does not protect the
75% of residents unwilling to travel for health care services. 355 Furthermore, testimony indicated that the presence of two hospitals in
Ukiah made administrators more sensitive to quality concerns and
physician requests for new equipment. 356 The decision, however, implies that the merged Ukiah facility will be responsive to competition
346. Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. at 288-97. The parties did not disagree
about the definition of the relevant product market, and the FTC Commission accepted the ALl's decision that the relevant product market consisted
of acute inpatient care hospital services. Id. at 288 .
. 347. [d. at 285.
348. Adventist Health Sys., 117 F.T.C. at 284-85.
349. [d. at 291.
350. [d.
351. [d. at 292-93. The statistics indicated that although the hospitals drew 91
percent of their patients from the area, approximately 25 percent of patients sought hospital services outside of these three areas. [d. at 294.
352. [d. at 293-94 (noting the lack of testimony indicating that patients could not
go to Lakeport). The FTC's expert advocated the Ukiah-Willits-Lakeport
market, not the Ukiah-Willits market. [d. In addition, the hospital in Willits was an affiliate of AHS/West and was unlikely to be a competitive alternative if the merged Ukiah hospitals raised prices. [d.
353. [d. at 297.
354. See Blackstone and Fuhr, supra note 345, at 959.
355. See id; see also Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. at 294.
356. Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. at 294; Blackstone and Fuhr, supra
note 345, at 960.
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located sixty miles away.357 While the merger produced some efficiencies, such as the elimination of duplicate services, the merger also
eliminated local competition that served to bolster the quality of hospital services. It appears unwise to assume that a small rural hospital,
offering only primary care services and obstetric services, will remain
conscious of what a larger urban tertiary care facility sixty miles away is
doing with respect to quality and prices. 358
The general rule, that competition fosters lower costs and more efficient services, does not apply to a merger between two entities located
in a rural area. 359 This is known as the rural exception. In effect, this
exception promotes anti-competitive behavior and allows rural hospitals to merge regardless of the consequences to consumers. In the
Ukiah case, the Administrative Law Judge determined, however, that
the duplication of services in a rural area actually increased the cost of
health care because the duplicated services sparked a "medical arms
race."360
In a rural merger case, economies of scale often justifY and provide
support for the merger of the only two providers. 361 Small rural hospitals often suffer from higher costs, making it more difficult to realize
an economy of scale. 362 The merger of two rural hospitals can eliminate inefficiency and overcapacity (an excess number of beds) and
achieve an economy of scale. 363
Two additional standards can also justifY a rural hospital merger:
(1) the minimum efficient size for a hospital is at least 100 beds;364
and (2) a new standard is one and one-half to two beds per 1000 people. 365 If applied to the Ukiah case, these standards support the
merger. First, UAH and UGH combined have ninety-four beds,366 just
six beds short of the efficient size. 367 Second, Ukiah's population of
40,000 justifies between sixty and eighty beds. 368 The numbers indi357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

See Blackstone and Fuhr, supra note 345, at 969.
See generally Blackstone and Fuhr, supra note 345.
See id. at 969-70.
See id. at 961.
See id. at 966.
See id. at 964.
See id. at 964-66.
See id. at 964.
See id.
See Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. at 286; see also Blackstone and Fuhr,
supra note 363, at 955 (indicating that UAH had forty-three beds and UGH
had fifty-one beds).
367. See Blackstone and Fuhr, supra note 363, at 964.
368. See id.
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cate that Ukiah can efficiently support only one hospital, and the
merger succeeded.
The rural exception, as set forth in the 1996 Statements,369 is contradictory to the goal of providing consumers with a wide range of
choices. 37o Choice in a rural area can be completely eliminated, yet
the merger is allowed to proceed. The merger essentially dictates
where patients must go for care and what services the patients can
easily obtain. Efficiencies and economies of scale prevail over consumer choice. The focus may still be on the consumer by providing
lower prices through an economy of scale, but the focus is not on
consumer choice.
VII.

THE SHERMAN ACT

The Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce" in interstate commerce. 371 The main purpose of the Sherman
Act is to prevent combinations, such as mergers or acquisitions, and
conspiracies, such as those to raise prices, in undue restraint of trade
or tending to monopolize the free market. 372 The FTC's jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act is very broad, and is "generally coextensive
with Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause."373 The
FTC's jurisdiction under the Clayton Act is more limited,374 however,
the purposes of each act are similar. The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act both seek to prohibit combinations of companies that would
interfere with the free market and thus lessen competition.

A.

Possible Convergence of the Clayton and Sherman Acts

The Clayton Act's purpose is to stop restraints of trade in their incipiency.375 The purpose of the Sherman Act is to nullify agreements
369. See supra note 331 for the text of Statement 1.
370. But see 1996 DOJ/FfC STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN
HEALTH CARE, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.htm at Intr~
duction (stating that a goal of the exception is to provide consumers with a
range of choices).
371. 15 U.S.CA § 1 (West 1997).
372. See generally D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165
(1915); United States v. Am. Optical Co., 97 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
373. Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 998, 1010 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
374. See supra notes 133-62 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text; see also Baker, supra note 14,
at 113.
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currently restraining trade. 376 Hence, the intent of the two acts is different, but the practical distinction between them is insignificant. 377
The court's application of the Clayton Act in Hospital Corporation of
America v. FrQ378 explained that mergers are forbidden if they are
likely to "hurt consumers, as by making it easier for the firms in the
market to collude, expressly or tacitly, and thereby force price above
or farther above the competitive level. "379 A merger with the effect of
increasing prices would also violate section 1 of the Sherman Act380
because, "[b]oth statutes as currently understood prevent transactions likely to reduce competition substantially."381
Given the unresolved nature of the difference, if any, between judging the lawfulness of a transaction under section 1 of the Sherman Act
or section 7 of the Clayton Act, an analysis of cases decided under the
Sherman Act will be discussed. Sherman Act cases may provide additional guidance for the agencies when challenging a hospital merger
case that lessens consumer choice.

B.

Case Law Under the Sherman Act Applying the Rule of Reason Analysis

In the following Sherman Act cases that will be examined, the
courts applied the Rule of Reason analysis. The Rule of Reason analysis was adopted from common law382 and prohibits acts, agreements,
or contracts that prejudice public interest, obstruct the due course of
trade, or injuriously restrain trade. 383 The test of legality under the
Rule of Reason is whether the restraint imposed regulates and perhaps promotes competition, or whether it suppresses or destroys competition. 384 Absent some pro-competitive virtue, such as the creation
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

383.
384.

See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1997); see also Baker, sUfrra note 14, at 113.
See Baker, supra note 14, at 113.
807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1386.
See United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285, 1283 (7th
Cir. 1990); see also 15 U.S.CA § 1 (West 1997).
Rnckford, 898 F.2d at 1283.
See 54 AM. ]UR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices
§ 48 (1996). The Supreme Court adopted the Rule of Reason analysis in
United States v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386-87 (1956)
and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,61-62 (1911).
See 54 AM. ]UR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices
§ 48 (1996).
See id. This test was articulated in National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (quoting Board of Trade of Chicago v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918», and FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists,
476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) (holding that a refusal to compete with respect
to a package of services offered to customers impaired "the ability of the
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of efficiencies, conduct that impairs the natural ability of the market
to provide desired goods or services cannot be sustained under the
Rule of Reason analysis. 385
This analysis requires a determination of the particular facts of each
case. 386 In some cases, a determination of reasonableness may depend on the intent of the conduct and the method used to obtain
control over commerce or competition. 387 A good intention, however, will not evade scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 388
Conduct violates section 1 of the Sherman Act if an unreasonable restraint is either its intent or effect. 389

1.

National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States

National Society of Professional Engineers v. United State~90 specifically
addresses the issue of consumer choice. The National Society of Professional Engineers (Society) was a society that dealt with the nontechnical aspects of the engineering practice. 391 Such aspects included the promotion of its members' professional, social, and economic interests. 392 In pertinent part, section 11 of the Society's Code
of Ethics states:
The Engineer will not compete unfairly with another engineer by attempting to obtain employment or advancement
or professional engagements by competitive bidding .... He
shall not solicit or submit engineering proposals on the basis
of competitive bidding .... An Engineer requested to submit a fee proposal or bid prior to the selection of an engineer or firm subject to the negotiation of a satisfactory
contract, shall attempt to have the procedure changed to
conform to ethical practices, but if not successful he shall
withdraw from consideration for the proposed work. 393

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

market to advance social welfare by ensuring the provision of desired goods
and services to consumers at a price approximating the marginal cost of
providing them").
See 54 AM. JUR. 20 Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices
§ 48 (1996).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
435 U.S. 679 (1978).
[d. at 682.
[d.
National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 683 n.3 (quoting section 11 (c) of
Society's Code of Ethics).
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The Society forbade its members from negotiating or discussing fees
until after the prospective client selected an engineer. 394
The DO] filed a complaint under section 1 of the Sherman Act alleging that price competition among the members was suppressed
and that customers were deprived of the benefits of the free market. 395 The Society argued that section 11 of their Code of Ethics was
reasonable because competition among professional engineers was
contrary to the public interest, and the prohibition of competitive bidding was necessary to protect the public's health, safety, and
welfare. 396
The Court, however, disagreed. 397 In its analysis, the Court applied
the Rule of Reason analysis to determine whether the proscription on
competitive bidding impacted competitive conditions. 398 "[T]he purpose of the analysis is to form ajudgment about the competitive significance of the restraint .... "399
The Court determined that the agreement in section 11 constituted
an absolute ban on competitive bidding. 40o The Court agreed with
the district court ruling that the ban "'impedes the ordinary give and
take of the market place,' and substantially deprives the customer of
'the ability to utilize and compare prices in selecting engineering services.' "401 The ban on competitive bidding prevented customers from
making price comparisons when initially attempting to select an engineer, and also imposed the Society's views of costs and benefits on the
entire market. 402

2.

FTC v. Indiana Federation oj Dentists

FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists403 is a case closer on point
because it directly relates to the health care industry. In an effort to
contain costs, dental health insurers implemented "alternative benefits" plans that required an evaluation by the insurer of the treating
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Id. at 684.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1997).
National Soc'y of ProJ'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 684-85.
Id. at 693-94.
Id. at 688. The analysis under the Rule of Reason is to determine whether
the restraint promoted or suppressed competition. Id. at 691. See also
supra notes 386-89 for a discussion of the Rule of Reason analysis.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id. at 692-693 (quoting United States v. National Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs, 404
F. Supp. 457,460 (D.D.C. 1975)).
See id. at 695.
476 U.S. 447 (1986).
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dentist's diagnosis and recommendation. 404 Insurers often requested
the dentist to submit the x-rays used to examine the patient, the necessary insurance claim forms, and any other information concerning the
patient's diagnosis and recommended treatment. 405
In an effort to hinder the implementation of these alternative benefit plans, approximately eighty-five percent of dentists in Indiana
formed the Indiana Dental Association (IDA) and refused to submit xrays, in conjunction with claim forms, to insurers. 406 The IDA was successful and many insurers were unable to obtain compliance with
their requests for x_rays.407 As a result, insurers were forced either to
use more expensive means of making alternative benefits determinations, such as visiting the dentists' office, or to completely abandon
their efforts. 408 Eventually, out of fear of antitrust liability, a majority
of the dentists in IDA agreed to the FrC's cease and desist order. 409
A number of dentists, who were still unwilling to comply with the
insurers' requests and to submit x-rays, formed the Indiana Federation of Dentists (IFD) in order to continue the original plan initiated
by the IDA. 410 In an effort to disguise itself from antitrust agencies,
the IFD labeled itself a "union"411 and then issued a rule forbidding
members to submit x_rays.412
The FrC found, in its own hearing, that IFD's restraint was an unfair method of competition and violated section 5 of the Federal

404. Id. at 449.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 449-50. An IDA official revealed the dentists' motive in refusing to
comply with requests relating to alternative benefits plan determinations:
We are fighting an economic war where the very survival of our
profession is at stake .... The name of the game is money. The
government and labor are determined to reduce the cost of the
dental health dollar at the expense of the dentist. There is no way
a dental service can be rendered cheaper when the third party has
to have its share of the dollar.
Id. at 450 n.1. This can be construed as further evidence of the influence of
third-party payors.
407. Id. at 450.
408. Id. at 450.
409. Id. at 450-51.
410. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 451.
411. Id. Labor unions have certain exemptions from antitrust liability.
412. Id.
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Trade Commission Act. 413 IFD sought judicial review from the Seventh Circuit,414 and the FTC appealed to the Supreme Court. 415
The Court found that the FTC's findings were supported by substantial evidence, that IFD's actions constituted a violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act, and thus also, that IFD's actions violated section 5
of the FTC Act. 416 In reaching this conclusion, the Court again applied the Rule of Reason analysis. 417
The Court determined that IFD's policy amounted to a horizontal
agreement that served to withhold a service that customers desired:
the forwarding of x-rays along with claim forms. 418 This refusal to
compete impaired the market's ability to advance social welfare byensuring the provision of desired goods and services. 419 In sum, IFD was
not allowed to determine, on behalf of its customers, who were both
patients and their insurers, which goods or services they should
receive. 420
Following the decision in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States,421 the IFD Court stated:
Absent some countervailing procompetitive virtue - such as,
for example, the creation of efficiencies in the operation of a
market or the provision of goods and services, - such an
agreement limiting consumer choice by impeding the 'ordinary give and take of the market place,' cannot be sustained
under the Rule of Reason.422
The Court stated that the FTC's failure to engage in a detailed market analysis was not fatal to its finding of a violation of the Rule of
Reason. 423 Although the purpose of market analysis is to determine
whether the activity in question had the potential to produce adverse
effects on competition, proof of actual detrimental effects obviated
the need for a detailed market analysis. 424
413. Id.
414. See Indiana Fed'n of Dentists v. FTC, 745 F.2d 1124, 1126 (7th Cir. 1984).
The Seventh Circuit vacated the cease and desist order on the grounds that
it was not supported by substantial evidence. See id.
415. See Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 453.
416. Id. at 465-66.
417. See id. at 459.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
422. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459 (quoting National Soc; of Profl
Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692) (citations omitted).
423. Id. at 460.
424. See id. at 460-61 (citing 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law 11 1511 at 429 (1986)).
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Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.

In Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak CO.,425 the plaintiff
alleged that Kodak restricted access to its photocopier and micrographic parts by refusing to sell these necessary parts to independent
service organizations (ISOs).426 ISOs were limited in their ability to
compete in the service market for Kodak machines due to the restriction on parts. 427
Service and parts for Kodak equipment were not interchangeable
with other service and parts, hence the court defined the relevant
market as those companies that serviced Kodak machines. 428 The record revealed that Kodak had a ninety-five percent share of the Kodak
high volume copier service market and an eighty-eight percent share
of the Kodak micrographic service market. 429 When Kodak began implementing restrictions on the availability of its parts, some ISOs withdrew from the Kodak service market or substantially restricted their
service since parts were not readily available. 430 As a result, Kodak
customers were "locked-in" to obtaining the necessary service and
parts from Kodak. 431
Evidence showed that Kodak practiced price discrimination by selling parts to customers who serviced their own equipment, but refusing to sell parts to customers who hired ISOs. 432 In addition, the cost
of switching to a different product was expensive. 433 These two factors
combined "locked-in" customers. 434 The Court stated that:
If the cost of switching is high, consumers who already have
purchased the equipment, and are thus "locked-in," will tolerate some level of service-price increases before changing
equipment brands. Under this scenario, a seller profitably
could maintain supracompetitive prices in the aftermarket if
the switching costs were high relative to the increase in ser425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.

432.
433.
434.

125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1201.
Id.
Id. at 1203 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504
U.S. 451, 482 (1992».
Id. at 1212.
Id.
Id., 125 F.3d at 1212. The Ninth Circuit, hearing the case on remand, did
not fully discuss the "lock-in" concept, but included a reference to the Supreme Court case that discussed the concept. See id.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476
(1992).
Id.
Id.
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vice prices, and the number of locked-in customers were
high relative to the number of new purchasers. 435
The Court concluded that a jury could reasonably infer that Kodak
made a conscious choice to gain immediate profits by exerting market
power where locked-in customers, high information costs, and discriminatory pricing limited long-term 10ss.436
In addition to acknowledging that customers experienced a "lockin," the Ninth Circuit also concluded that Kodak's market share in the
equipment market further limited consumers' choices. 437 In sum, Kodak refused to deal with its customers in order to control a downstream market. 438
VIII.

CONCLUSION

"Hospital markets are predominandy local in nature and, by conventional measures often, highly concentrated."439 In addition, hospitals provide unique services. As one court stated:
For many services provided by acute-care hospitals, there is
no competition from other sorts ofprovider[s]. If you need
a kidney transplant, or a mastectomy, or if you have a stroke
or a heart attack or a gunshot wound, you will go (or be
taken) to an acute-care hospital for inpatient treatment. The
fact that for other services you have a choice between inpatient care at such a hospital and outpatient care elsewhere
places no check on the prices of the services we have listed,
for their prices are not linked to the prices of services that
are not substitutes or complements. If you need your hip
replaced, you can't decide to have chemotherapy instead because it's available on an outpatient basis at a lower price. 440
As the judge in Rockford emphasized, there are no substitutes for certain services. For many services, the consumer's choice is already limited to either having the necessary treatment or not.
There is no question that health care expenses are high and continuously increasing, but consumers should not have their choices limited because merging hospitals claim efficiencies that are often not
justified. In addition, consumers should not be pawns of managed
care organizations and third-party payors. The consumers in this in435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

Id.
Id. at 477-78.
Image Technical Seros., 125 F.3d at 1212.
Id. at 1211.
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stance are patients with specific health care needs. They should be
able to receive the necessary treatment from the doctor or hospital of
their choice.
As Philadelphia National Bank pointed out, consumers should be at
the forefront of the merger analysis. 441 Often, "there is no alternative
source outside the realm of general acute care inpatient hospitals to
which a patient can tum to obtain such services in response to a small
but significant price increase."442 In addition, consumers generally
will not use outpatient services as a substitute for some inpatient services in response to price increases of general acute-care inpatient
services. 443
Choice can still be limited, despite the fact that the FTC and DO]
attempt to ensure that more than one hospital is available in any given
geographic area to guarantee consumer choice. 444 While the Agencies have a foundation of case law on which to rely in arguing against a
hospital merger that limits consumer choice,445 some additional improvements can be made.
Hospitals should be held to the efficiencies standard and analysis
contained in Staples. 446 Hospital efficiency studies should be carefully
scrutinized to ensure with some certainty that the efficiencies will be
realized and passed on to consumers.
Furthermore, a uniform standard needs to be implemented in order to define the geographic market area. As shown by the case law,
the Agencies and the hospitals have several different ways to measure
the geographic market. 447 However, uniform standards should ensure that consumers have a viable alternative if the merger is allowed.
A hospital located forty or sixty miles away, such as in rural cases, is
not necessarily a viable alternative, particularly in the case of an emergency where the patient requires trauma or tertiary care services. This
rationale should also apply to reproductive services. Patients should
not be forced, due to a merger, to travel extensive distances, thereby
increasing costs, to obtain elective health care services.
The rural exception448 should also be carefully analyzed. In many
rural cases, the merger is justified by the numbers. 449 The agencies,
441. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
442. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (W.D. Mich.
1996).
443. See id.
444. See Choslovsky, supra note 24, at 309.
445. See supra Part V.
446. See supra Part V.C.2.c. for a discussion of FTC v. Staples.
447. See supra Part V. C.l.h.
448. See supra Part VI.
449. See supra notes 331-34 and accompanying text.
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however, must ensure that the merger will not eliminate a service previously provided by the merging hospitals. In addition, the large geographic market areas usually defined in rural cases450 should be
reviewed. While some rural consumers may be willing to travel longer
distances to obtain necessary health care services, other rural consumers may be less willing to travel or simply cannot afford to travel. 451
These large geographic markets could present a problem if a rural
patient required an extensive stay at an urban hospital. The immediate family may be required to drive back and forth, possibly 120 to 240
miles roundtrip like in the Ukiah case,452 or have to stay at a hotel near
the urban hospital.
The Agencies should further ensure that consumers do not get
"locked-in" to only one hospital. 453 The combination of merger effects and the strong influence of third-party payors could disadvantage
consumers. This powerful combination could eliminate consumer
choice.
Proper analysis under the Clayton Act,454 or possibly the Sherman
Act,455 could ensure that consumers will continue to have a choice
regarding their health care needs. If a merger is allowed, the agencies
should ensure that the merged institution does not later find it "efficient" to discontinue a service.
In sum, competition ensures consumer choice and protects consumers from paying too much for their health care needs. If the antitrust laws are not able to protect consumers, then other methods need
to be explored, such as procedural reform. Current case law does provide a foundation for a merger challenge, however some aspects still
need further analysis and reform. The agencies need to resort back to
the original purpose of the Clayton Act and antitrust laws - protection
of competition and consumers.
Nicole Harrell Duke
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